Tuesday, May 16, 2006

Portugal's Pension Reform

by Edward Hugh

Portugal is going to reform it's pension system. This is hardly 'breaking news', but still it is something. Details at present are few, and probably it is a case of too little too late, but nontheless there do seem to be some interesting details. Like the idea of attaching contributions to the number of offspring. This makes a good deal of sense. In the short term this will not change things very much, but it may be a step in the right direction:

Workers with fewer than two children will have to contribute more to their government pensions under planned reforms to prevent the collapse of Portugal's retirement system, the prime minister said in an interview published Monday.

Contributions would stay unchanged for people with two children, decrease if they had more than two and increase if they had fewer, according to an interview with Socialist Prime Minister Jose Socratesto published in the Financial Times.

A Portuguese pension is calculated as a percentage of the top-earning 10 years of the last 15 years of the recipient's working life.

Under the reforms, the pension would be calculated according to the employee's entire working life, the Financial Times said.


Oh, and there was one other snippet in the same article:

With retirements looming for 78 million baby boomers, the trustees for the U.S. Social Security program said this month that its trust fund will be depleted in 2040, a year earlier than expected.The point at which the program will pay out more in benefits than it takes in will occur in 2017.

Tuesday, May 09, 2006

Islam in Russia: Evolution in action?

Last month, The Globe and Mail of Toronto published a series of five reports by Graeme Smith, "Russia Shrinks", devoted to an examination of some of the demographic dynamics at work in the present Russian Federation: the high death rate, the suspicions of Chinese immigration, most worryingly the growth of violent racist youth gangs and paramilitaries. Smith's report of the 25th, the article "Tensions rise in Lenin's hometown" was particularly interesting, examining the growth of Christian-Muslim tensions across Russia through the prism of events in Ulyvanosk Oblast.

Abdul Karim, 26, knelt on the thick carpets of the mosque after evening prayers and described how his Russian neighbours are getting interested in the previously obscure study of demographics.

"They know the number of non-Christians is increasing," Mr. Karim said. "They're afraid Muslims will populate the whole country. Muslim families have three or four children. Russians have one. The math is simple. Naturally, they're afraid."

Russia is shrinking. Demographers predict the country will lose almost a third of its population in the next half-century. But some minorities, most notably the Muslims, are defying the trend -- and their flourishing numbers have revived ancient fears among the ethnic Russians about being overrun.

Russia doesn't officially count its religious minorities, but estimates of the country's Muslims range from 14 million to 23 million, or 10 to 16 per cent of the population. Despite the imprecise numbers, it's generally accepted the figure is growing quickly. Fifteen years ago, Russia had about 300 mosques; today, there are at least 8,000.


Smith goes on to observe that in Ulyanovsk Oblast, even as the total population has shrunk the Tatar Muslim population has grown sharply to reach 12% of the province's total population. He fits this into a general and growing hostility towards Muslims in Russia, precipitated by the bloody wars in Chechnya and exacerbated by the fact that Muslim populations in Russia are growing where non-Muslim populations are shrinking. Islam is newly visible in Russia, and this disturbs many. American observer Paul Goble has gone so far as to predict that Russia will become a Muslim-majority country, pointing out Russia's Muslim population has increased by 40% and claiming that anywhere from 2.5 million to 3.5 million Muslims now live in Moscow.

Gobel and others are quite correct in noting that Islam in the Russian Federation has become more prominent than ever before. However, contrary to what some people might believe, Islam in Russia has a long presence, extending at least as far back as the conquest of the regions of the Middle Volga in the 16th century, which brought the Tatars and related Turkic peoples on the Middle Volga into the Russian state. In the 18th and 19th centuries, Russian conquests in the North Caucasus brought the Muslim peoples of this region--Dagestanis, Circassians, Chechens, Ingush, and others--into the Russian state. Further afield, the independent states of Central Asia and Azerbaijan were brought into the Russian state as part of the same imperialist push that incorporated the North Caucasus. Total estimates on the size of Russia's Muslim population vary substantially, ranging from a low of 5% who describe themselves as practising Muslims to 17% who are of Muslim background. Suffice it to say that Russia's Muslim community is of much older vintage than the Muslim communities of other European countries, and that it is both absolutely and relatively much larger than any found in the European Union. If anything, the collapse of the Soviet Union has left Moscow with many fewer Muslims under its rule than it had for generations; if, as some suggest, the North Caucasian republics are allowed to drift away from Russia on the model of France's withdrawal from Algeria, the numbers will at least stabilize if they don't drop still further.

Will Russia be Islamized as the population of ethnic Russians shrinks while the Muslim populations grow? This depends on what one means by "Islamize." Certainly the profile of Muslims in Russia is going to increase sharply, as it has since the 1980s when the Muslim populations of what was then the former Soviet Union began to oppose the forced secularization and Russification of the Communist era. It would have to have risen--the sharp growth in the number of mosques has to be seen in the context of the general revival of religion in post-Communist Russia. Further, the fact that the Muslim population of the Russian heartland is growing sharply has to be seen in light of the fact that this area is not only richer than the Muslim areas of the North Caucasus, itself one of the poorest regions of the Russian Federation, but that the Russian heartland's relative wealth makes it a magnet for immigrants from across the former Soviet space and beyond. People from Kyrgyzstan are as likely to migrate to the Russian Federation as people from Moldova; life in isolated post-Soviet countries is equally hard regardless of whether the religion of the majority population is Islam. Too, it's worth noting that Muslim-majority former Soviet republics all exhibit TFRs lower than those exhibited in North America or Australasia in those continent's post-Second World War baby booms, often much lower; Soviet rule really did accelerate the demographic modernization of these areas.

Valery Tishkov and Valery Stepanov took an invaluable look at the evolution of the Russian population in their analysis of the 2002 Russian census. They noted that "[t]he overall number of Russians decreased by 3%, and their share in the country's population fell by 2%" owing to the aging of the Russian population, but further noted that this overall tendency towards population shrinkage was substantially compensated by the immigration of Slavs and by the assimilation of such ethnic minorities like Russia's Ukrainians, Chuvash, Mordovians, and Belarusians. Russia's Muslim populations did resist the tendency to assimilate somewhat: The country's substantial Tatar, Bashkir, and (surprisingly) Chechen populations did grow somewhat through natural increase, while immigration was responsible for the sharp growth of Kazakhs and Azeris. The Muslim peoples of the Russian Federation are only somewhat behind their non-Muslim counterparts in the demographic transition; as Nicholas Eberstadt noted in a September 2004 analysis ("The Russian Federation at the Dawn of the Twenty-first Century: Trapped in a Demographic Straitjacket", PDF format), only the republics of Ingushetia and Dagestan seem to be at replacement levels of fertility. Even assuming that out-migration from Muslim-majority areas has artificially depressed measured fertility, Russian Muslims aren't having that many kids. If the Tatar women of Ulyanovsk really are all having three or four children, they're decidedly anomalous.

None of this means that the Russian population of 2050 is not going to be more Muslim in origins than the Russian population now. It certainly will be: Russian and Eurasian Muslims might be well advanced in the demographic transition, but population momentum inside the Russian Federation and migration from the Russian near abroad is going to push the total proportion up. I remain skeptical, given low rates of religious practice, high rates of intermarriage and assimilation, and the nature of Russia's Muslim community as an aggregate of multiple diasporas, that most of the Russian population is going to be made up of practising Muslims as some Russian Muslims predict. Like most former empires, Russia is a pretty effective melting pot: Even Tatarstan's relatively successful nation-building is weakened by the dispersal of most Tatars outside of Tatarstan and by the relatively high rates of assimilation inside that autonomous republic. Besides, given the apparent ascendancy of the ideology of Eurasianism in Russia, it's not at all obvious that a more strongly Muslim population will necessarily change that much, at least so long as obvious provocations are avoided on all sides and the full assimilation of Russian Muslims as equal citizens made possible.

Unfortunately, as Dora Apel warns at Open Democracy, the ascendancy of xenophobic and explicitly anti-Muslim ideologies in Russia and the Islamization of the Chechnya issue threaten to do just this. It goes without saying that this is a terrible mistake. Russia's population is projected to decline sharply in the generations to come, even with the demographic dynamism lent it by its Muslim populations. Especially with the prospect of western and central Europe offering better living and working conditions for potential migrants, Russia just cannot afford to exclude a large and growing share of its population. Frighteningly, it may do just that with obvious calamitous consequences for everyone involved. Here's to hoping that the best-case scenarios materialize.

Friday, May 05, 2006

Does the Canadian example work for France?

Sarkozy's proposed new immigration policies for France are somewhat flattering for Canada, inasmuch as observers have pointed to Canada's immigration policies and inflows as ideal situations for France.

France's plan to cherry pick immigrants with the skills it needs is a step in the right direction if the euro zone's second biggest economy wants to remain competitive, according to analysts.

Their main caveat is that the new immigration bill, which Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy unveiled amid controversy this week, might not go far enough to beat off international competition to attract the best brains in the world and keep the economy ahead in terms of skills and productivity.

Sarkozy has proposed creating a 3-year residence permit for qualified workers and making it easier to recruit foreigners in sectors that face staffing shortages, such as catering.

The bill also plans to force newcomers to take French and civics lessons and an end to the automatic right to a long-term residence permit after 10 years in France. But firms and economists are focusing on the move to selective immigration.

"Today it is a real battle to bring over foreign workers," said Jerome Renon, director of France Immigration which specializes in helping companies with immigration issues. It has about 40 clients, most of them big international firms.

"There is so much unemployment in France that it is difficult to bring in foreigners -- you have to explain to immigration officials why you need this person when about 10 percent of people in France are out of work."


The main criticism that this bill has received from economists is that it is too timid, particularly in its relatively delayed and insecure extension of citizenship and residency rights. France certainly has its own attractions, not least its status as the second- or third-largest national economy in the European Union and its centrality in la francophonie, but will these be enough given France's late entry?

That said, the success of Canada's immigration policies isn't unqualified, but is in fact highly contingent on a suite of demographic and economic factors.. It is true that, compared to France's incoming migrants, Canada's incoming migrants tend to benefit from higher levels of education than their French counterparts. That said, I wonder if the relative success of Canadian immigration policy might stem from the fact that Canada's population profile is well-suited for a strong migrant flow. Canada's population profile is fundamentally dissimilar from France, Canada's population being younger, with fewer children but many more immigrants. Canada's TFR of 1.53 children born per woman is decidedly low by the standards of other First World Anglophone and Francophone countries, and partly as a result, fully two-thirds of Canadian population growth comes from immigration.

Normally such a high rate of immigration-driven population growth might be expected to cause a serious stir, but it hasn't. Why? I suspect that one reason lies in Canada's maintenance of rates of labour participation considering above typcial western European neighbours. Without immigration and with Canada's birth dearth, in fact, there might conceivably be labour shortages across the country. Immigration fills a necessary economic role with relatively few apparent negative consequences. At present, as Brian Ray wrote for Migration Information ("Canada: Policy Changes and Integration Challenges in an Increasingly Diverse Society "), in recent years a bit more than half of Canada's admitted economic immigrants admitted according to the point system geared towards the admission of economically suitable immigrants, while a quarter or so are admitted under the guise of family reunification and most of the remainder are refugees. If labour market conditions were more difficult, quite conceivably Canada's 20th century immigration policies might have moved away from their current focus on economic and humanitarian grounds for migration.

Even though Canada's immigrant inflow is overwhelmingly directed towards urban areas and tends to be highly skilled, there is still a lag of a decade before employment catches up to levels among the Canadian-born, even now after the past decade of strong employment growth noted last month by Statistics Canada. More worrying that, even after the lag time is ended and relatively high levels of human capital, immigrants in Canada seem to lack the social capital necessary to succeed, with levels of poverty which remain above and levels of income which remain below the standards experienced by the average Canadian-born. It's not at all uncommon to hear about people highly educated in one country who comes to Canada and find that their credentials and experience aren't recognized in Canada, forcing them either to train to gain Canadian credentials or to work below their skill levels even though they may have been admitted because of their experience at home. This unjust outcome may just be tolerable--for immigrants and for the wider Canadian population--when the availability of employment per se isn't in question, and especially when Canadian-born citizens don't suffer visibly as a consequence. In the context of the rigid labour market that still exists in France the admission of highly-skilled immigrants, this may well be a recipe for social disaster. I suspect that unless Sarkozy is careful, ensuring the full recognition of foreign credentials at a minimum so as to allow for the free circulation of immigrant professionals in France at large, his plans might be a bit premature.