-In a truly fascinating article from last fall, Mara Hvistendahl looks at the causes and consequences of China's gender imbalance. The gender imbalance in Asia in general and China in particular will be one of the most important social phenomena in this century and this article does a great job of exploring it. Highly recommended.
-Ulster's Dooomed is a blog devoted to what, according to the blogger, is the inevitable nationalist and Catholic majority in Northern Ireland. Although he obviously writes from a certain point of view, if you dig in the archives there's plenty of interesting political demography there, including district-by-district demographic analysis.
-For those who don't know about it, the UN's World Population Prospects Database is not a perfect resource for global demographic data, but it's the best we've got. It is more reliable than the CIA World Factbook and even when you have doubts about the accuracy they make it easy to figure out what their source is. With regards to their projections, they do have a track record of overestimating population growth and underestimating fertility decline, so caveat emptor.
-The South Koreans are getting very worried about their demographic prospects. Although the South Korean population is still comparatively young, they're aging quicker than anyone. Key quote: "The percentage of people in South Korea aged 65 and over will reach 11 percent next year, lower than the 15.9 percent average for advanced nations, but wil soar to 38.2 percent by 2050, surpassing the 26.2 percent average for advanced nations by a huge margin" Although they're aware of the problem and done some modest attempts to adress it, their pro-natalist policies have so far been spectacularly unsuccessful.
Tuesday, July 14, 2009
Thursday, July 09, 2009
Greenland: Dubai on the Arctic or slow decline?
Earlier this year, Greenland celebrated an expansion of home-rule, which was widely seen as an important step towards possible independence. For Greenlandic nationalists, the main goal has long been to end centuries of Danish rule, even though as colonial masters go, the Danes have been about as benevolent as they come. Greenlanders have a strong sense of nationhood and has under Danish rule been able to preserve its culture, notably its language since Denmark has mostly had a policy of leaving the Inuits alone except for the Christianization in the 18th century. But how viable is Greenland really as an independent nation?
The first obstacle that comes up is economic. Greenland today is dependent upon subsidies from the Danish state to the tune of 30% of Greenlandic GDP and more than half of government revenues. The usual solution to this is the hope that there is vast reserves of oil, natural gas and minerals, which will become accessible if Greenland continues to warm up. The idea is that global warming will make it possible to exploit off-shore resources despite the harsh climate. There is a lot of uncertainty and good reasons for scepticism about this, the climate is too harsh and the extent of the natural gas and available is uncertain. but even if the petroleum dream comes true, the demography does not work in Greenland’s favour.
One problem is, simply put, that Greenland’s population is too small with only 56 000 people for an area which is more than two million square kilometres, three times the size of Texas or half the size of the European Union. About 50,000 are Greenlandic while the rest are mainly Danes. The lack of population alone means that Greenland would be dependent on other countries for education. Having to send people abroad for university education is an obstacle, but still, there are successful statelets with small populations, like Iceland (pop. 300,000) and the Cayman Islands (pop. 50,000) in addition to relatively poor island states.
However, unlike the more successful states but just like many indigenous peoples elsewhere, Greenland suffers from severe social problems. The native Greenlandic population, mostly Inuits, although often with mixed Inuit-Nordic heritage, has widespread problems with alcoholism. A recent survey (in Danish) indicated that 38% of Greenlandic men and 12% of the women showed signs of “damaging abuse of alcohol or alcohol dependency”. Greenland has the highest suicide rate in the world with an annual rate of more than 1 in 1000. (And no, it is not the latitude and lack of sun. The Scandinavian countries have, contrary to popular myth, suicide rates that are about average for the developed word, i.e. 0.1 in 1000) and the education level is very low. In 1996 (Danish) only 2.8% had a university education and people with higher education are disproportionally not native but recruited from elsewhere, mostly Denmark. In addition there are problems with violence, including relatively high rates of domestic abuse.
All of this makes it difficult for Greenland both to retain its own and attract new immigrants. Although fertility rates are relatively high and stable in the 2.2-2.4 range, Greenland has had a net emigration of 300-500 people annually in recent years, which is obviously significant in a country where 800-900 people are born annually. In fact, Greenland’s population is now definitely declining despite high birth rates
Where does this leave Greenland? Well, it is absolutely dependent on Denmark, not just for subsidies but also for qualified labor. Compared to its neighbour Iceland, it not only has a smaller population but also significantly lower human capital. Even if natural gas exploitation became viable, Greenland would be completely reliant on foreign labor to exploit it since the Greenlandic population has neither the numbers nor the qualifications required. In the unlikely scenario that the most optimistic predictions become true, the Greenlandic people, like the Emirates, risk becoming a minority in their own country. Moreover, there are serious questions about whether the Greenlandic authorities have the institutional resilience and strength required to manage a sudden influx of oil wealth in a responsible manner. Certainly, in the past there has been accusations of widespread nepotism, if not outright corruption, which does not bode well for the future.
The sad fact is that Greenland does not have the demographic and social strength to become a viable independent country. Thus, even in the best-case scenario it is likely to remain dependent on Denmark or other countries if not for money, then at least for qualified, educated people. In perhaps the most likely scenario, there will continue to be a dual dependency. Meanwhile, Greenlandic youth will continue to emigrate and Greenland will continue to suffer a demographic decline.
Wednesday, July 08, 2009
More on Cuban population futures
Cuba's population aging, which I blogged about back in August 2006, is starting to gain more press attention.
The article goes on to note that, with strained pension and other welfare systems, the standard of living for Cuban seniors may be quite low. Moreover, as the article notes, Cuba's aging isn't helped by emigration; the abstract "Cuban International Migration and Low Fertility Conditions ..." makes the point that Cuba's natural increase is diminished substantially by emigration. This will alter Cuba's standing in the Caribbean: A G. Edward Ebanks notes in his paper, continued high population growth in the Dominican Republic can expected to make that country the largest Hispanophone country in the Caribbean by the mid-21st century, while--he does not say, but this can be inferred--the Dominican Republic's lack of controls on internal migration allows for more fluid population distributions more suitable for an effective capitalist economy.
The UNFPA paper Social policies, family arrangements and population ageing in Cuba, by Rolando García Quiñones, goes into substantial detail. The findings are relatively predictable: Urban and developed areas are relatively older than rural and underdeveloped areas, the size of the average family has declined even as younger people find it necessary to stay in the family home on account of housing issues, and so on. The raising of the retirement age is something that receives extended treatment.
Until 2008, retirement age was 55 years for women and 60 for men. A new Law on Social and Security Assistance, approved by the end of last year by Parliament, came into effect on January 2009. Among other aspects, the new law modifies retirement age, increasing it by 5 years. But this increase will be gradual.
From 2009 onwards, retirement age will be raised six months each year, up to the year 2018, when it would be established at 60 years for women and 65 for men. Its application during the next ten years defers the retirement of more than 285 thousand people, with a saving of 4.5 billion pesos to the Social Security coffers. In the mean time it has been decided to increase the retirement benefits and to establish other benefits.
Of course, things can and will be complicated by migration. I've blogged about the division between Cubas A and B, a relatively developed west and a relatively underdeveloped east that traditionally produces migrants. Let's not forget the United States, home to a Cuban-American community with members numbering more than a tenth of the population of Cuba itself and concentrated in a south Florida that's the nearest point of American land to Cuba itself, providing beside numerous human links to sustain chain migration.
These migrations, on top of the general population aging, will certainly have a major impact on Cuba's long-term prospects. Replacement migration is a possibility, I suppose, but where from? Cuba's high human development doesn't correspond to the sort of high economic development that attracts migrants. It may well be that even with a best-case post-Castro transition, Cuba's economic prospects may be hamstrung by an excess of seniors and an insufficiency of workers. What the consequences of this would be for Cuban stability I leave to others to imagine.
This country reached a tipping point in 2006. It wasn’t any one event in particular, but according to Cuba’s Office of National Statistics, the island’s population of 11.2 million stopped growing that year, and dipped slightly. And it has been falling ever since.
Cuba’s population is projected to decrease by 100,000 by 2025, and the arithmetic behind that decline is a simple matter of subtraction: More and more Cubans are leaving the island, and Cuban mothers are having fewer children. The country’s fertility rate of 1.4 children per woman ranks as the lowest in Latin America.
The statistics highlight a risky demographic experiment that has been developing here for years.
While Cuba’s socialist health care system takes good care of the elderly and has prolonged life expectancy rates, the island’s lousy economy--squeezed by U.S. trade sanctions and its own inefficiencies--is driving young people to emigrate, while limiting family size.
As a result, senior citizens will be one of the fast-growing sectors of Cuba’s population in the coming decades. Life expectancy in Cuba is now 75 years for men and 79 for women, roughly on par with the United States, where those figures are 75 and 80, respectively, according to United Nations statistics. By 2025, according a recent article on the topic in Cuba’s communist newspaper Granma, 26 percent of Cubans will be 60 or older--the highest percentage of seniors in Latin America.
The article goes on to note that, with strained pension and other welfare systems, the standard of living for Cuban seniors may be quite low. Moreover, as the article notes, Cuba's aging isn't helped by emigration; the abstract "Cuban International Migration and Low Fertility Conditions ..." makes the point that Cuba's natural increase is diminished substantially by emigration. This will alter Cuba's standing in the Caribbean: A G. Edward Ebanks notes in his paper, continued high population growth in the Dominican Republic can expected to make that country the largest Hispanophone country in the Caribbean by the mid-21st century, while--he does not say, but this can be inferred--the Dominican Republic's lack of controls on internal migration allows for more fluid population distributions more suitable for an effective capitalist economy.
The UNFPA paper Social policies, family arrangements and population ageing in Cuba, by Rolando García Quiñones, goes into substantial detail. The findings are relatively predictable: Urban and developed areas are relatively older than rural and underdeveloped areas, the size of the average family has declined even as younger people find it necessary to stay in the family home on account of housing issues, and so on. The raising of the retirement age is something that receives extended treatment.
Until 2008, retirement age was 55 years for women and 60 for men. A new Law on Social and Security Assistance, approved by the end of last year by Parliament, came into effect on January 2009. Among other aspects, the new law modifies retirement age, increasing it by 5 years. But this increase will be gradual.
From 2009 onwards, retirement age will be raised six months each year, up to the year 2018, when it would be established at 60 years for women and 65 for men. Its application during the next ten years defers the retirement of more than 285 thousand people, with a saving of 4.5 billion pesos to the Social Security coffers. In the mean time it has been decided to increase the retirement benefits and to establish other benefits.
Of course, things can and will be complicated by migration. I've blogged about the division between Cubas A and B, a relatively developed west and a relatively underdeveloped east that traditionally produces migrants. Let's not forget the United States, home to a Cuban-American community with members numbering more than a tenth of the population of Cuba itself and concentrated in a south Florida that's the nearest point of American land to Cuba itself, providing beside numerous human links to sustain chain migration.
These migrations, on top of the general population aging, will certainly have a major impact on Cuba's long-term prospects. Replacement migration is a possibility, I suppose, but where from? Cuba's high human development doesn't correspond to the sort of high economic development that attracts migrants. It may well be that even with a best-case post-Castro transition, Cuba's economic prospects may be hamstrung by an excess of seniors and an insufficiency of workers. What the consequences of this would be for Cuban stability I leave to others to imagine.
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