A couple of weeks ago Randy reported on this and how immigration plays a crucial part in reversing the current demographic trends in Italy. I am going to follow his lead and present to you this article from The Economist (walled for non-subscribers) on the political discourse in Italy on the very subject of immigration. The article is not very elaborate but still the former Prime Minister Berlusconi and his friends in the Northern League are well interesting to listen to.
'On August 25th Italy's opposition leader told a meeting of conservative Roman Catholics that he and his centre-right allies believed in an Italy that was “Catholic and for Italians”, whereas the centre-left camp headed by Romano Prodi, the prime minister, wanted a “multi-ethnic” nation.
Since Italy is already multi-ethnic—at least 6.5% of the population is thought to be made up of legal and illegal immigrants—Mr Berlusconi presumably meant multi-religious and multicultural. In any event his remark signalled that race and identity will be a hot topic this autumn. The government plans radical changes to an immigration law introduced by Mr Berlusconi's government in 2002. Before going on holiday, ministers agreed that the time legal immigrants must wait before seeking citizenship should be halved to five years.'
Opportunism and populism will do no good to the attempt of bringing a decent long term solution to the table.
'For Mr Berlusconi and some of his allies—particularly in the xenophobic Northern League—that is not enough. But what made his comment incendiary was the fact that it came amid a spate of well-publicised crimes that left many wondering if length of stay should be the only condition for citizenship.'
A very faint hope I should say ...
Meanwhile Brescia's latest horror—a triple killing, possibly linked to east European organised crime—has prompted a protest by supporters of the far right. It is a situation that calls for care from the government, and responsibility from the opposition.'
Thursday, August 31, 2006
Saturday, August 12, 2006
Cuba's past and future populations
For most of its post-Columbian history, Cuba has had a relatively small population, numbering barely more than a quarter-million people by 1792 and only reaching the total of one million people in the 1840s. During the first three centuries of Spanish rule, Cuba was neglected in preference to the much richer mainland; in the final century of Spanish rule, a Cuba that was now one of Spain's major colonies prospered thanks to an open economy dominated by its sugar plantations. Cuba's white population was bolstered first by the immigration of French refugees from the future Haiti then by substantial immigration from metropolitan Spain, complementing a very large Afro-Cuban population and the substantial Chinese Cuban community created, like the other Asian immigrant communities in the 19th century Caribbean, to replace the labour that enslaved Africans were once forced to provide.
The incessant wars of independence in the late 19th century slowed Cuba's growth somewhat. After Cuba became independent, the 1899 census recorded a total population of 1.57 million people, 89% of whom were born in Cuba. This Cuba was still at a very early
Abel F. Losada Alvarez' 2000 paper "Demographic change and economic growth in Cuba (1898-1958)" (PDF format) provides an excellent outline of the first six decades of independent Cuba's demographic history.
Alvarez suggests that Cuba's population was helped along in its "demographic modernization" by the immigration of more than a million people in the three decades after independence, including 735 thousand immigrants from Spain. These Spanish immigrants, mostly from the regions of Galicia and Asturias in the northwest of Spain and from the insular Canary Islands, had already adopted for themselves many of the contraceptive and other behaviours typical of populations advanced on the demographic transition and communicated them to Cubans. Other factors--the growth of a culture of mass media and mass consumption aided by the nearness of the United States, Cuba's increasing urbanization, and a rapidly rising standard of living--played their standard role. By the time of the Cuban Revolution, despite continued high rates of net immigration from Spain and the Caribbean as well as a high birth rate, Cuba's population was starting to stabilize.
Cuba's Communization changed these trends substantially. After a brief post-revolutionary baby boom, Cuba went through an accelerated transition, TFRs dropping below replacement levels in 1978. At the same time, Cuba abruptly became a country of mass emigration; to date, more than a million Cubans have emigrated in successive waves, most to the United States where these have formed a famously coherent Cuban-American community in exile. Cuba's population growth has continued throughout the forty-seven years of Castro's rule and is still relatively young by the standards of First World countries, but with sustained sub-replacement fertility rates and continued high rates of emigration it is fast tapering off.
How is the Cuban population likely to evolve in the coming years? Sergio Díaz-Briquets' "Cuba's future Economic Crisis: The Ageing Population and the Social Safety Net" paints an alarming picture. As a result of Cuba's particular demographic trends, Cuba's "median age has risen from 23.4 years in 1960 to 32.9 in 2000; it is projected to increase to 43.1 by 2025, rising even further by 2050, the end of the projection period." This rapid aging will have serious effects on the Cuban work force.
By comparison, in 2050 the Dominican Republic is expected to have a PSR of 4 and Chile and the United States PSRs of 3. The problem of underfunded retirement and pension systems that bedevils First World countries will be catastrophic for Cuba, in Díaz-Briquets' words possibly "imperil[ling] the country’s economic development since financing pension and health care programs will consume a disproportionate share of national resources. Paying for elderly services will be a major drag on the economy, placing a heavy tax burden on individuals and businesses. The tax burden may even be so onerous as to make Cuba less than attractive as an international investment destination."
Cuba's substantial economic underperformance, taking Cuba from a position alongside the richest countries of Latin America and southern Europe to one closer to the poorer countries of the Caribbean and Central America, thus might never be remedied. Indeed, it almost certainly will worsen Cuba's population prospects. Leaving aside the obvious economic incentives for potential emigrants from Cuba, Luis Locay argues in his papers "Schooling vs. Human Capital: How Prepared is Cuba's Labor Force to Function in a Market Economy?" (PDF format) and "The Future of Cuba's Labor Market: Prospects and Recommendations" (PDF format) that Cuba's well-educated labor force is inefficiently deployed, with the professional sectors of the Cuban economy having far too many workers for their own good. Locay concludes in his second paper that "[t]he current occupational and skill distributions of Cuba’s labor force are probably quite different from what they will be in a future market-oriented economy. Considerable retooling will be necessary. This not only will be costly, but also means that Cuba’s relatively high levels of education and large stock of professional talent overstate the earning capacity of the island’s labor force." A population with basic expectations that aren't likely to be met in its country is certain to produce a good number of emigrants.
Students of Cuba's likely post-Castro transition have looked around the world for likely models. People interested in Cuba's population prospects might be best served by looking at the example of Bulgaria, where the country's population has fallen through the emigration of something like one million Bulgarians--a ninth of the 1990 population--between 1990 and 2005. Presently standing at 7.7 million, Bulgaria's population is commonly projected to fall by another third to 4.8 million by 2050, thanks to lowest-low fertility and massive emigration. Bulgaria is by some measures three times as wealthy as Cuba, though; disparities between the living standards of Bulgaria and Greece are much smaller than those prevailing between Cuba on the one hand and the United States or Spain on the other. Moldova's experience might be worth keeping in mind.
Most of the estimates made of Cuba's future population expect the island nation's population to remain more or less stable until 2050 at around 11 million people. It's safe to say that these estimates are almost certainly overcounts. For the time being, I feel comfortable in predicting that after Castro, the Cuban diaspora will grow very strongly indeed.
The incessant wars of independence in the late 19th century slowed Cuba's growth somewhat. After Cuba became independent, the 1899 census recorded a total population of 1.57 million people, 89% of whom were born in Cuba. This Cuba was still at a very early
Abel F. Losada Alvarez' 2000 paper "Demographic change and economic growth in Cuba (1898-1958)" (PDF format) provides an excellent outline of the first six decades of independent Cuba's demographic history.
Let us bear in mind that most works on economic growth in developing countries locate the development threshold, demographically speaking, at a life expectancy between 50 and 55 years of age and a net reproduction rate between 2.0 and 1.75. In 1953, Cuba was already on its way to the so-called "modern population growth", with a life expectancy slightly over 60 for both sexes and a NRR of around 1.75.
In the 1950-1955 period, Cuba was clearly outside the "Strategic Growth Territory" of Latin America at that point, in an intermediate position between the Western European "territory" of the thirties and that of the whole of Latin America around 1985-90. These stages of demographic development have been conformed by the confluence of modernization factors and elements which have conditioned the rhythm and variety of this modernization.
Alvarez suggests that Cuba's population was helped along in its "demographic modernization" by the immigration of more than a million people in the three decades after independence, including 735 thousand immigrants from Spain. These Spanish immigrants, mostly from the regions of Galicia and Asturias in the northwest of Spain and from the insular Canary Islands, had already adopted for themselves many of the contraceptive and other behaviours typical of populations advanced on the demographic transition and communicated them to Cubans. Other factors--the growth of a culture of mass media and mass consumption aided by the nearness of the United States, Cuba's increasing urbanization, and a rapidly rising standard of living--played their standard role. By the time of the Cuban Revolution, despite continued high rates of net immigration from Spain and the Caribbean as well as a high birth rate, Cuba's population was starting to stabilize.
Cuba's Communization changed these trends substantially. After a brief post-revolutionary baby boom, Cuba went through an accelerated transition, TFRs dropping below replacement levels in 1978. At the same time, Cuba abruptly became a country of mass emigration; to date, more than a million Cubans have emigrated in successive waves, most to the United States where these have formed a famously coherent Cuban-American community in exile. Cuba's population growth has continued throughout the forty-seven years of Castro's rule and is still relatively young by the standards of First World countries, but with sustained sub-replacement fertility rates and continued high rates of emigration it is fast tapering off.
How is the Cuban population likely to evolve in the coming years? Sergio Díaz-Briquets' "Cuba's future Economic Crisis: The Ageing Population and the Social Safety Net" paints an alarming picture. As a result of Cuba's particular demographic trends, Cuba's "median age has risen from 23.4 years in 1960 to 32.9 in 2000; it is projected to increase to 43.1 by 2025, rising even further by 2050, the end of the projection period." This rapid aging will have serious effects on the Cuban work force.
In 2002, when the country had 1.6 million elderly, the [Potential Support Ratio] in Cuba was 7, a relatively favorable ratio. By 2050, as the number of elderly is projected to reach 3.7 million, with a relatively unchanged overall population size, the PSR is expected to decline to 2 potential workers per retiree.
By comparison, in 2050 the Dominican Republic is expected to have a PSR of 4 and Chile and the United States PSRs of 3. The problem of underfunded retirement and pension systems that bedevils First World countries will be catastrophic for Cuba, in Díaz-Briquets' words possibly "imperil[ling] the country’s economic development since financing pension and health care programs will consume a disproportionate share of national resources. Paying for elderly services will be a major drag on the economy, placing a heavy tax burden on individuals and businesses. The tax burden may even be so onerous as to make Cuba less than attractive as an international investment destination."
Cuba's substantial economic underperformance, taking Cuba from a position alongside the richest countries of Latin America and southern Europe to one closer to the poorer countries of the Caribbean and Central America, thus might never be remedied. Indeed, it almost certainly will worsen Cuba's population prospects. Leaving aside the obvious economic incentives for potential emigrants from Cuba, Luis Locay argues in his papers "Schooling vs. Human Capital: How Prepared is Cuba's Labor Force to Function in a Market Economy?" (PDF format) and "The Future of Cuba's Labor Market: Prospects and Recommendations" (PDF format) that Cuba's well-educated labor force is inefficiently deployed, with the professional sectors of the Cuban economy having far too many workers for their own good. Locay concludes in his second paper that "[t]he current occupational and skill distributions of Cuba’s labor force are probably quite different from what they will be in a future market-oriented economy. Considerable retooling will be necessary. This not only will be costly, but also means that Cuba’s relatively high levels of education and large stock of professional talent overstate the earning capacity of the island’s labor force." A population with basic expectations that aren't likely to be met in its country is certain to produce a good number of emigrants.
Students of Cuba's likely post-Castro transition have looked around the world for likely models. People interested in Cuba's population prospects might be best served by looking at the example of Bulgaria, where the country's population has fallen through the emigration of something like one million Bulgarians--a ninth of the 1990 population--between 1990 and 2005. Presently standing at 7.7 million, Bulgaria's population is commonly projected to fall by another third to 4.8 million by 2050, thanks to lowest-low fertility and massive emigration. Bulgaria is by some measures three times as wealthy as Cuba, though; disparities between the living standards of Bulgaria and Greece are much smaller than those prevailing between Cuba on the one hand and the United States or Spain on the other. Moldova's experience might be worth keeping in mind.
Most of the estimates made of Cuba's future population expect the island nation's population to remain more or less stable until 2050 at around 11 million people. It's safe to say that these estimates are almost certainly overcounts. For the time being, I feel comfortable in predicting that after Castro, the Cuban diaspora will grow very strongly indeed.
Thursday, August 10, 2006
Myths and realities about Italy's immigrants
A recent Financial Times article concerned with surveying immigration to Italy begins with scenes from the Mediterranean island of Lampedusa, once a tourist destination of note now famous as a stopping point for illegal immigrants crossing the Mediterranean via boats. In fact, as the article goes on to explain, only a tenth of Italy's immigrants came to their new country of residence via sea travel. Most Italian immigrants are simply people who, after arriving legally in Italy, overstayed their visas, often finding new jobs. Italy's immigrant population encompasses quite a few more national groups than rhetoric often suggests, with the sizable Latin American and African contingents outnumbered by migrants from central and eastern Europe, as the Istituto Nazionale di Statistica's 2004 statistics demonstrate.
It goes without saying that this substantial immigration plays a critical role in at least delaying the population shrinkage ensured by Italy's continuing lowest-low fertility. Ideally, the Italian government would create a legal infrastructure that would make it easier for immigrants to integrate themselves into Italy, for their own sake and for the benefit of Italy as a whole. Unfortunately, the controversy aroused the Prodi government's recent proposal to extend voting rights and expedited citizenship to immigrants suggests otherwise.
According to Istat, Italy's national statistics institute, there were 903,000 eastern Europeans from non-EU countries legally resident in Italy on January 1, 2005, making them the biggest bloc of foreigners by geographical origin.
They included 317,000 Albanians, 249,000 Romanians, 93,000 Ukrainians and 38,000 Moldovans – figures that come as no surprise to anyone who knows the numerous small towns south of Rome where such immigrants work as cleaners, gardeners and mechanics.
By contrast, Africans legally resident in Italy numbered 642,000, among whom Moroccans were much the largest community, accounting for 295,000 of the total.
The next largest group consisted of Asians – some 405,000 in number, including 112,000 Chinese, 83,000 Filipinos and 54,000 Indians.
Lastly, there were 230,000 people from the Americas, with 53,000 Ecuadoreans, an equal number of Peruvians and other Central and South Americans making up the vast majority.
In all, 2.4m foreigners were registered as living in Italy, although the figure today may be closer to 2.8m, or 4.8 per cent of the population, according to Caritas Italiana, a Roman Catholic organisation that specialises in immigration studies.
It goes without saying that this substantial immigration plays a critical role in at least delaying the population shrinkage ensured by Italy's continuing lowest-low fertility. Ideally, the Italian government would create a legal infrastructure that would make it easier for immigrants to integrate themselves into Italy, for their own sake and for the benefit of Italy as a whole. Unfortunately, the controversy aroused the Prodi government's recent proposal to extend voting rights and expedited citizenship to immigrants suggests otherwise.
Wednesday, August 02, 2006
Lithuania
The End of the Road In Lithuania?
I am sorry for the rather dramatic headline deployed above but I really don't think that any of this should be taken lightly. I will begin with this short yet very telling note from Bloomberg which informs us that unemployment in Lithuania dropped to a staggering 2.7% in June. This of course signifies an extremely tight labour market and quite simply this cannot go on for much longer. The clear evidence of this is first and foremost to be found in the quarterly y-o-y GDP figures which demonstrate Lithunia's sizzling growth rates much alike the other Baltic countries. As such, Q1 2007 saw an annual growth rate of 8.3% and on average the last five quarters saw a growth rate of GDP of 7.8%. This is of course putting strains of capacity in Lithunia and like in the rest of the Baltic countries the short term cyclical indicators point to very brisk growth in labour costs.
continue reading
Lithuania Under the Loop
As promised below in my brief note on my continuous coverage of the CEE economies I am going to take a close look at Lithunia's economy and as such try to give a solid picture of what the risks are of a hard landing. More specifically, I will be looking at the labour market and the formation of price and employment expectations. My immediate impetus to do this is the amount of attention I got regarding my last in-depth look at Lithuania where I asked the timely of whether in fact Lithuania was running fast out of capacity relative to the sizzling growth rates. In short, I want all my bases covered on this one.
continue reading
I am sorry for the rather dramatic headline deployed above but I really don't think that any of this should be taken lightly. I will begin with this short yet very telling note from Bloomberg which informs us that unemployment in Lithuania dropped to a staggering 2.7% in June. This of course signifies an extremely tight labour market and quite simply this cannot go on for much longer. The clear evidence of this is first and foremost to be found in the quarterly y-o-y GDP figures which demonstrate Lithunia's sizzling growth rates much alike the other Baltic countries. As such, Q1 2007 saw an annual growth rate of 8.3% and on average the last five quarters saw a growth rate of GDP of 7.8%. This is of course putting strains of capacity in Lithunia and like in the rest of the Baltic countries the short term cyclical indicators point to very brisk growth in labour costs.
continue reading
Lithuania Under the Loop
As promised below in my brief note on my continuous coverage of the CEE economies I am going to take a close look at Lithunia's economy and as such try to give a solid picture of what the risks are of a hard landing. More specifically, I will be looking at the labour market and the formation of price and employment expectations. My immediate impetus to do this is the amount of attention I got regarding my last in-depth look at Lithuania where I asked the timely of whether in fact Lithuania was running fast out of capacity relative to the sizzling growth rates. In short, I want all my bases covered on this one.
continue reading
Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan Fertility and Migration
As should be evident from the last post, Claus and I have really been pretty shocked by the rapidity with which labour market tightening has been emerging in Eastern Europe recently. As Claus noted, this recognition lead me to take the Economist quite sharply to task on Afoe, and at least I managed to sting a response from their Central European correspondent Edward Lucas, who, as Claus would tell us, is far from being a worst case example of benign neglect here, in fact, in general terms, au contraire.
continue reading
As should be evident from the last post, Claus and I have really been pretty shocked by the rapidity with which labour market tightening has been emerging in Eastern Europe recently. As Claus noted, this recognition lead me to take the Economist quite sharply to task on Afoe, and at least I managed to sting a response from their Central European correspondent Edward Lucas, who, as Claus would tell us, is far from being a worst case example of benign neglect here, in fact, in general terms, au contraire.
continue reading
Ukraine
Ukraine Population and Fertility
This is the latest in a series of posts here at Demography Matters about population dynamics in Eastern Europe and the CIS countries. At the present time we are paying particular attention to these countries since their short term demographic situation seems so complex and it is important to get a much more general idea of the magnitude of the problem.
Continue Reading
This is the latest in a series of posts here at Demography Matters about population dynamics in Eastern Europe and the CIS countries. At the present time we are paying particular attention to these countries since their short term demographic situation seems so complex and it is important to get a much more general idea of the magnitude of the problem.
Continue Reading
France
France, its Muslims, and the Future
Of late, it has frequently been suggested that France--and increasingly, not only France but western Europe as a whole--is heading for a Muslim majority. No longer will France be plausibly described as the "eldest daughter" of the Catholic Church; no longer will Luther’s church have any sway in his homeland; no longer will local Christianities mark the daily lives of people in Spain and Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden. Instead of church towers, we will have minarets. Instead of the code napoléon, we will have the shari’a. Instead of women sunning themselves on Mediterranean beaches and same-sex marriage in the Low Countries, we’ll have women forced to wear burqas and gays once again closeted. The past centuries of social liberalization in Europe will be brutally reversed, as Europe enters a new dark age. (But particularly France, since it has too many Muslims to be saved.)
continue reading
Of late, it has frequently been suggested that France--and increasingly, not only France but western Europe as a whole--is heading for a Muslim majority. No longer will France be plausibly described as the "eldest daughter" of the Catholic Church; no longer will Luther’s church have any sway in his homeland; no longer will local Christianities mark the daily lives of people in Spain and Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden. Instead of church towers, we will have minarets. Instead of the code napoléon, we will have the shari’a. Instead of women sunning themselves on Mediterranean beaches and same-sex marriage in the Low Countries, we’ll have women forced to wear burqas and gays once again closeted. The past centuries of social liberalization in Europe will be brutally reversed, as Europe enters a new dark age. (But particularly France, since it has too many Muslims to be saved.)
continue reading
France - Europe's New Sick Man?
As
Latvia
Latvian Population Dynamics
I seem to be having a Latvia week. I gave a long post on Global Economy Matters analysing the current serious wage and price inflation problem the country is having, and a shorter summary post (more accessible if you are not an economist) on A Fistful of Euros which really tries to draw attention to why the problems this comparatively small country (population around 2 million) is having may be significant and interesting for people to think about in a much more general context.
continue reading
The Latvian Economy
by Edward Hugh
Something is afoot in Latvia. According to the latest Eurostat data on annual wage costs, in the first quarter of 2007 wages in Latvia were up by an astonishing 32.7% when compared with the first quarter of 2006 (for a simple graph of the course of Latvian wages since 2001 try this) . Without knowing anything more about Latvia it is obvious that something important is happening here, and that the situation as it stands is clearly unsustainable.
continue reading
The Latvian Economy
by Edward Hugh: Barcelona
Something is afoot in Latvia. Being alerted by reports which have appeared in the press in recent days to the very rapid rate of wage increases they have been experiencing there I decided to dig a little deeper, and in the process I came across this recent IMF statement on Latvia, where I read the following:
"Latvia, like other recent EU entrants, has benefited from an accession-related boost to income convergence....."Recently, however, fast credit and wage growth has caused the economy to diverge from a balanced and sustainable growth path, with domestic demand outstripping Latvia's supply capacity. As a result, overheating has intensified, bringing higher price and wage inflation, a sharply wider current account deficit, and greater external indebtedness. Rapid credit growth in euros has left large currency mismatches on the balance sheets of households and corporates and a boom in housing prices that has diverted resources from the tradable sector. A pervasive "buy now-pay later" mindset has settled in and is heightening systemic risk. These developments, if not tackled firmly, will thwart a recovery of export growth."
continue reading
I seem to be having a Latvia week. I gave a long post on Global Economy Matters analysing the current serious wage and price inflation problem the country is having, and a shorter summary post (more accessible if you are not an economist) on A Fistful of Euros which really tries to draw attention to why the problems this comparatively small country (population around 2 million) is having may be significant and interesting for people to think about in a much more general context.
continue reading
The Latvian Economy
by Edward Hugh
Something is afoot in Latvia. According to the latest Eurostat data on annual wage costs, in the first quarter of 2007 wages in Latvia were up by an astonishing 32.7% when compared with the first quarter of 2006 (for a simple graph of the course of Latvian wages since 2001 try this) . Without knowing anything more about Latvia it is obvious that something important is happening here, and that the situation as it stands is clearly unsustainable.
continue reading
The Latvian Economy
by Edward Hugh: Barcelona
Something is afoot in Latvia. Being alerted by reports which have appeared in the press in recent days to the very rapid rate of wage increases they have been experiencing there I decided to dig a little deeper, and in the process I came across this recent IMF statement on Latvia, where I read the following:
"Latvia, like other recent EU entrants, has benefited from an accession-related boost to income convergence....."Recently, however, fast credit and wage growth has caused the economy to diverge from a balanced and sustainable growth path, with domestic demand outstripping Latvia's supply capacity. As a result, overheating has intensified, bringing higher price and wage inflation, a sharply wider current account deficit, and greater external indebtedness. Rapid credit growth in euros has left large currency mismatches on the balance sheets of households and corporates and a boom in housing prices that has diverted resources from the tradable sector. A pervasive "buy now-pay later" mindset has settled in and is heightening systemic risk. These developments, if not tackled firmly, will thwart a recovery of export growth."
continue reading
Poland
Pragmatism in Poland?
Well, it certainly seems as if something has dawned on somebody in Poland.
Poland is loosening its visa restrictions on workers from Ukraine, Belarus and Russia in order to ease a labor shortage in the farming and construction sectors, the Labor Ministry said Wednesday.
New rules go into effect this Friday, slashing the cost of work visas for citizens from the three former Soviet republics from 900 zlotys (US$330; €240) to 100 zlotys (US$37; €27), and easing bureaucratic restrictions, the deputy minister of labor, Kazimierz Kuberski, told the news agency PAP.
continue reading
More on Poland ...
We are not quite done with Poland and Eastern Europe yet and I don't suspect we will be soon. As such, this is very much an ongoing (fast) process both in terms of what actually goes on the ground in CEE economies but also when it comes to our investigation of the matter. In the post below, I noted briefly how Poland is now taking concrete steps to address the issue of labour shortage. This piece from Ukrayinska Pravda further elaborates ...
continue reading
Running out of Capacity in Central and Eastern Europe
Well, it is pretty much official now I think that some countries in Eastern Europe might be heading for an economic crash. As such, both the FT and the Economist recently ran articles on this topic in which warnings were duly handed out. On the record, I am pretty convinced myself that some countries might crash very soon among those the most notable candidates being Latvia and Lithuania. Behind this doom and gloom call is a very simple hypothesis that demographics matter for economic growth and that this fact is now hitting home big time in the CEE countries proxied by dwindling capacity to match expectations of economic growth and prosperity.
continue reading
Why it's not a good idea to scare away the creative class
In a recent report, Wirtualna Polska emphasized how the large population of Polish emigrants is not only relatively young and well-educated, but not very likely to return to Poland despite retaining strong ties with Polish culture.
Polish emigration to the UK and the Republic of Ireland since the May 2004 entry into the European Union has reached 500,000 to 2 mln people, research firm ARC said in a report out Thursday.
continue reading
Polish Fertility
This post is a brief "state of the game" one to accompany my last one on capacity problems in the Polish labour market. Firstly this link from the External service of Polish Radio which makes the claim that in 2005 Poland had the lowest fertility in the EU, at 1.24:
The declining birth rate observed for years has prompted the government to come up with a long-term pro-family program, which is expected to encourage women to have more kids. Poland’s fertility rate - that is the number of children per one woman – is the lowest in Europe. In 2005 it was 1.24, whereas the EU average is 1.5, according to a report just published by the statistical office of the European Union – Eurostat.
continue reading
Poland, Is The Party Over?
Claus has been posting on some of the macroeconomic capacity issues which face the East European "Lynx" economies in the light of massive demographic exodus that has taken place in some countries in this group in recent years.
I had long meant to post about this article from the Financial Times, which drew attention to the way in which young university graduates have been leaving Poland, and in particular Eastern Poland, in very large numbers:
continue reading
Well, it certainly seems as if something has dawned on somebody in Poland.
Poland is loosening its visa restrictions on workers from Ukraine, Belarus and Russia in order to ease a labor shortage in the farming and construction sectors, the Labor Ministry said Wednesday.
New rules go into effect this Friday, slashing the cost of work visas for citizens from the three former Soviet republics from 900 zlotys (US$330; €240) to 100 zlotys (US$37; €27), and easing bureaucratic restrictions, the deputy minister of labor, Kazimierz Kuberski, told the news agency PAP.
continue reading
More on Poland ...
We are not quite done with Poland and Eastern Europe yet and I don't suspect we will be soon. As such, this is very much an ongoing (fast) process both in terms of what actually goes on the ground in CEE economies but also when it comes to our investigation of the matter. In the post below, I noted briefly how Poland is now taking concrete steps to address the issue of labour shortage. This piece from Ukrayinska Pravda further elaborates ...
continue reading
Running out of Capacity in Central and Eastern Europe
Well, it is pretty much official now I think that some countries in Eastern Europe might be heading for an economic crash. As such, both the FT and the Economist recently ran articles on this topic in which warnings were duly handed out. On the record, I am pretty convinced myself that some countries might crash very soon among those the most notable candidates being Latvia and Lithuania. Behind this doom and gloom call is a very simple hypothesis that demographics matter for economic growth and that this fact is now hitting home big time in the CEE countries proxied by dwindling capacity to match expectations of economic growth and prosperity.
continue reading
Why it's not a good idea to scare away the creative class
In a recent report, Wirtualna Polska emphasized how the large population of Polish emigrants is not only relatively young and well-educated, but not very likely to return to Poland despite retaining strong ties with Polish culture.
Polish emigration to the UK and the Republic of Ireland since the May 2004 entry into the European Union has reached 500,000 to 2 mln people, research firm ARC said in a report out Thursday.
continue reading
Polish Fertility
This post is a brief "state of the game" one to accompany my last one on capacity problems in the Polish labour market. Firstly this link from the External service of Polish Radio which makes the claim that in 2005 Poland had the lowest fertility in the EU, at 1.24:
The declining birth rate observed for years has prompted the government to come up with a long-term pro-family program, which is expected to encourage women to have more kids. Poland’s fertility rate - that is the number of children per one woman – is the lowest in Europe. In 2005 it was 1.24, whereas the EU average is 1.5, according to a report just published by the statistical office of the European Union – Eurostat.
continue reading
Poland, Is The Party Over?
Claus has been posting on some of the macroeconomic capacity issues which face the East European "Lynx" economies in the light of massive demographic exodus that has taken place in some countries in this group in recent years.
I had long meant to post about this article from the Financial Times, which drew attention to the way in which young university graduates have been leaving Poland, and in particular Eastern Poland, in very large numbers:
continue reading
Morocco
Fertility in Morocco
Actually the big demographic news of the moment has to be what is going-off in the stretch of water between Mauritania and the Canary Islands. Since I am posting on this separately at A Fistful of Euros, I thought it might be timely to also take a quick look at why Moroccan immigration into Spain isn't the big issue everyone thought it was going to be. Basically, as we can now see from the rising importance of Sub-Saharan migration to Spain, there are nothing like the number of Moroccans arriving in Spain - at least proportionately - as there were back in the 1990s. Undoubtedly there are many reasons for this change, but one of these without doubt is the impact of the demographic transition on Morocco itself.
continue reading
Actually the big demographic news of the moment has to be what is going-off in the stretch of water between Mauritania and the Canary Islands. Since I am posting on this separately at A Fistful of Euros, I thought it might be timely to also take a quick look at why Moroccan immigration into Spain isn't the big issue everyone thought it was going to be. Basically, as we can now see from the rising importance of Sub-Saharan migration to Spain, there are nothing like the number of Moroccans arriving in Spain - at least proportionately - as there were back in the 1990s. Undoubtedly there are many reasons for this change, but one of these without doubt is the impact of the demographic transition on Morocco itself.
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Measuring Fertility
CFR and TFR in Sweden
This post is related to both the one which comes before it and the one which follows. CFR refers to cohort fertility rate and TFR to total fertility rate.
Fertility can be measured in a number of ways, and two of the most important of these are the total fertility rate and the cohort fertility rate. The total fertility rate (TFR) is an estimate of periodic fertility and is defined as the sum of number of children born by women in a defined age range (16-49) extrapolated to the lifetime fertility of the total number of women in that age group. The cohort fertility rate (CFR) is the average number of children which women actually give birth to during their lifetime fertility cycle, and is only known when the women in the cohort end their fertile life. CFR is an accurate and important indicator since it measures whether the completed fertility for women achieves replacement level or not. The replacement level is the number of children per woman (approximately 2.1) needed in order to hold the population constant.
continue reading
This post is related to both the one which comes before it and the one which follows. CFR refers to cohort fertility rate and TFR to total fertility rate.
Fertility can be measured in a number of ways, and two of the most important of these are the total fertility rate and the cohort fertility rate. The total fertility rate (TFR) is an estimate of periodic fertility and is defined as the sum of number of children born by women in a defined age range (16-49) extrapolated to the lifetime fertility of the total number of women in that age group. The cohort fertility rate (CFR) is the average number of children which women actually give birth to during their lifetime fertility cycle, and is only known when the women in the cohort end their fertile life. CFR is an accurate and important indicator since it measures whether the completed fertility for women achieves replacement level or not. The replacement level is the number of children per woman (approximately 2.1) needed in order to hold the population constant.
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Gender Imbalances
How do rich Asians adapt to unbalanced sex ratios?
In a recent issue of Le Monde Diplomatique, Isabelle Attané describes in her article "L'Asie manque de femmes", the boy-biased ratio of boys to girls at birth in many of the largest countries of Asia: 117 in China, 111 in India, 110 in Taiwan, 108 in South Korea, 106 in Indonesia. This excess is a relatively recent phenomenon, beginning only in the 1980s when the demographic transition accelerated in these countries and parents, unwilling to incur cultural and economic disadvantages of bearing daughters to full term, began to produce only sons. Attané concludes her article with an apocalyptic floush, invoking the images of social collapse produced by such a global excess of Lebanese Amin Maalouf's 1992 novel The First Century After Beatrice (Le premier siècle après Béatrice).
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Gender Imbalances
Just a fairly brief post to sign-in again after what has been a rather long summer break. Claus and Randy have both put up recent posts which highlight the problem of demographic imbalances, and in particular gender related ones.
Randy points out that the long standing issue of 'excess' male births in the third world is likely to present a serious problem in the not too distant future with a lack of available marriage partners in large countries like India and China, a problem which will only serve to compound the pyramid structural issues associated with the arrival of below replacement fertility. Claus, on the other hand, directs our attention to the issues which arise in the context of a developed and rapidly ageing society like Germany, where it seems lack of economic growth is leading a growing number of young and qualified Germans to 'throw the towel in', and seek a seemingly brighter future elsewhere.
continue reading
In a recent issue of Le Monde Diplomatique, Isabelle Attané describes in her article "L'Asie manque de femmes", the boy-biased ratio of boys to girls at birth in many of the largest countries of Asia: 117 in China, 111 in India, 110 in Taiwan, 108 in South Korea, 106 in Indonesia. This excess is a relatively recent phenomenon, beginning only in the 1980s when the demographic transition accelerated in these countries and parents, unwilling to incur cultural and economic disadvantages of bearing daughters to full term, began to produce only sons. Attané concludes her article with an apocalyptic floush, invoking the images of social collapse produced by such a global excess of Lebanese Amin Maalouf's 1992 novel The First Century After Beatrice (Le premier siècle après Béatrice).
continue reading
Gender Imbalances
Just a fairly brief post to sign-in again after what has been a rather long summer break. Claus and Randy have both put up recent posts which highlight the problem of demographic imbalances, and in particular gender related ones.
Randy points out that the long standing issue of 'excess' male births in the third world is likely to present a serious problem in the not too distant future with a lack of available marriage partners in large countries like India and China, a problem which will only serve to compound the pyramid structural issues associated with the arrival of below replacement fertility. Claus, on the other hand, directs our attention to the issues which arise in the context of a developed and rapidly ageing society like Germany, where it seems lack of economic growth is leading a growing number of young and qualified Germans to 'throw the towel in', and seek a seemingly brighter future elsewhere.
continue reading
Canada
Canada and the USA: Demographically Different?
According to PRB.org's 2006 World Population Data Sheet Canada's population as of mid-2006 was 32.6 million while that of the USA was 299.1 million. The same document shows that the rate of natural increase in population for the two countries is 0.3 percent per year for Canada and 0.6 per year for the USA. So absent immigration the USA is expected to increase its population twice as fast as Canada on a percentage basis alone. When you take into account the base population number, we should expect to see Canada's population increase absent immigration by 97,800 persons whereas with the same criteria the US population should increase by 1,794,600 persons. A figure which is 18 times greater than the Canadian increase.
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The Alberta advantage
Edward mentioned yesterday the consequences that different rates of population change in different regions within a country can have on internal politics. Within Spain, as he noted, the fact that two of the regions experiencing the quickest population growth are the Spanish capital of Madrid and the nationalist and potentially separatist region of Catalonia is going to have interesting consequences for the future of Spanish federalism. Certainly, in Canada similar concerns over different rates of population change--especially changing fertility and immigration rates and the speed of language acquisition and loss--played a critical role in driving the growth of Québécois nationalism.
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Canadian exceptionalism revisited
Saturday the 1st of July was Canada Day, Canada's national holiday celebrating the formation of an autonomous Canadian state back on that date in 1867. In the 139 years since Canada's creation, the country's population has grown ninefold, this growth driven by a relatively strong rate natural increase and fairly heavy net migration.
In the past generation, the Canadian population has begun to evolve in ways that sets it apart from its peers. The province of Québec's historically high birth rate has famously collapsed after the Second World War.
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According to PRB.org's 2006 World Population Data Sheet Canada's population as of mid-2006 was 32.6 million while that of the USA was 299.1 million. The same document shows that the rate of natural increase in population for the two countries is 0.3 percent per year for Canada and 0.6 per year for the USA. So absent immigration the USA is expected to increase its population twice as fast as Canada on a percentage basis alone. When you take into account the base population number, we should expect to see Canada's population increase absent immigration by 97,800 persons whereas with the same criteria the US population should increase by 1,794,600 persons. A figure which is 18 times greater than the Canadian increase.
continue reading
The Alberta advantage
Edward mentioned yesterday the consequences that different rates of population change in different regions within a country can have on internal politics. Within Spain, as he noted, the fact that two of the regions experiencing the quickest population growth are the Spanish capital of Madrid and the nationalist and potentially separatist region of Catalonia is going to have interesting consequences for the future of Spanish federalism. Certainly, in Canada similar concerns over different rates of population change--especially changing fertility and immigration rates and the speed of language acquisition and loss--played a critical role in driving the growth of Québécois nationalism.
continue reading
Canadian exceptionalism revisited
Saturday the 1st of July was Canada Day, Canada's national holiday celebrating the formation of an autonomous Canadian state back on that date in 1867. In the 139 years since Canada's creation, the country's population has grown ninefold, this growth driven by a relatively strong rate natural increase and fairly heavy net migration.
In the past generation, the Canadian population has begun to evolve in ways that sets it apart from its peers. The province of Québec's historically high birth rate has famously collapsed after the Second World War.
continue reading
Japan
Japan A Suitable Place For Children?
The Japanese newspaper Asahi this weekend published the results of a survey carried out on behalf of the Japenese cabinet office into attitudes towards having children in Japan, South Korea, France, Sweden and the US.
Whereas in Europe and the United States respondents tended to indicate they expected to have all the children they wanted, of those Japanese interviewed who said that they want to have more children, 53.1 percent said they do not plan to do so. More than half of the South Koreans said the same.
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Recently I have been reading a lot of material about allocative decision processes coming from a branch of evolutionary anthropology known as Life History Theory (this is a reasonable summary paper). Now essentially life history theory is about the allocation of somatic energy resources to various competing demands (namely maintenance, growth and reproduction) in a way which has suprising parallels with the ways in which economic science tries to study how we take behavioural decisons between competing demands under similar resource constraints. Well, as I say I have been think about all this a lot, and then Lo and Behold:
Japan’s notoriously hard-working salarymen are being given a chance by the government to cut their hours in a bid to improve their health – and their fecundity.
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Japan revisited
The Japanese economy has certainly been a source of mixed signals since the BOJ decided to end the ultra-loose monetary policy and thus claimed to have ridden themself with the ugly beast of deflation. This subsequently prompted powerful opinion makers such as The Economist and the FT to hail Japan as an awoken tiger ready to take on the rest of the world.
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Crunchtime in Japan?
Well I have pointed to this several times and most recently as the CPI index was revised bringing Japan dangerously close to the 0% inflation mark amidst talks of business cycles topping and whether the BOJ should indeed raise rates any further. This is of course very unlikely now and the future road for Japan might very well be another period of deflation or at least no-one can rule out this possibility at the current juncture I think.
Now, a revision of the statistics might not be important in itself but let us take a quote from and article in The Economist I used as a source in one of my posts linked above.
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What is Happening to the Japanese Recovery?
Yep, what is indeed happening?
(From the FT Lex column - walled for non subscribers)
'What is happening to Japan’s economic recovery? Recent data shows workers are taking home only marginally bigger paycheques, and they are certainly not rushing to spend them: household spending, retail sales and housing starts all fell in the year to July.
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Japan’s Population Challenge
In one of those strange coincidences the world’s second and third largest economies are both scheduled to have elections next month - Japan on 11 September, and Germany on the 18th. The coincidences go further, since these two societies are leaders in another, non-economic, sense: they are leaders in the great global ageing revolution. Japan (at 42.64) and Germany (at 42.16) have the highest median ages of any OECD country (Italy comes third at 41.77, while the US is still a sprightly and young 36.27). The two countries also share the problem that they cannot pump up economic growth by introducing more liquidity (money) into the system, or at least the impact rates of doing so have become very low (see this post on the German problem)
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Why Worry About Japan?
Well I can think of several reasons, and none of them particularly related to the lamentable lack of security at nuclear power stations that was recently revealed there.
One good reason to worry might be the use and abuse of economic statistics that goes on in the Japanese context. I don’t know whether it is the fact that the Japanese economy is a topic which the majority of English language readers know so little about that means that normal caution is thrown to the winds, or whether Japanese obscurantism with the numbers themselves is the real culprit.
continue reading
The Japanese newspaper Asahi this weekend published the results of a survey carried out on behalf of the Japenese cabinet office into attitudes towards having children in Japan, South Korea, France, Sweden and the US.
Whereas in Europe and the United States respondents tended to indicate they expected to have all the children they wanted, of those Japanese interviewed who said that they want to have more children, 53.1 percent said they do not plan to do so. More than half of the South Koreans said the same.
continue reading
Recently I have been reading a lot of material about allocative decision processes coming from a branch of evolutionary anthropology known as Life History Theory (this is a reasonable summary paper). Now essentially life history theory is about the allocation of somatic energy resources to various competing demands (namely maintenance, growth and reproduction) in a way which has suprising parallels with the ways in which economic science tries to study how we take behavioural decisons between competing demands under similar resource constraints. Well, as I say I have been think about all this a lot, and then Lo and Behold:
Japan’s notoriously hard-working salarymen are being given a chance by the government to cut their hours in a bid to improve their health – and their fecundity.
continue reading
Japan revisited
The Japanese economy has certainly been a source of mixed signals since the BOJ decided to end the ultra-loose monetary policy and thus claimed to have ridden themself with the ugly beast of deflation. This subsequently prompted powerful opinion makers such as The Economist and the FT to hail Japan as an awoken tiger ready to take on the rest of the world.
continue reading
Crunchtime in Japan?
Well I have pointed to this several times and most recently as the CPI index was revised bringing Japan dangerously close to the 0% inflation mark amidst talks of business cycles topping and whether the BOJ should indeed raise rates any further. This is of course very unlikely now and the future road for Japan might very well be another period of deflation or at least no-one can rule out this possibility at the current juncture I think.
Now, a revision of the statistics might not be important in itself but let us take a quote from and article in The Economist I used as a source in one of my posts linked above.
continue reading
What is Happening to the Japanese Recovery?
Yep, what is indeed happening?
(From the FT Lex column - walled for non subscribers)
'What is happening to Japan’s economic recovery? Recent data shows workers are taking home only marginally bigger paycheques, and they are certainly not rushing to spend them: household spending, retail sales and housing starts all fell in the year to July.
continue reading
Japan’s Population Challenge
In one of those strange coincidences the world’s second and third largest economies are both scheduled to have elections next month - Japan on 11 September, and Germany on the 18th. The coincidences go further, since these two societies are leaders in another, non-economic, sense: they are leaders in the great global ageing revolution. Japan (at 42.64) and Germany (at 42.16) have the highest median ages of any OECD country (Italy comes third at 41.77, while the US is still a sprightly and young 36.27). The two countries also share the problem that they cannot pump up economic growth by introducing more liquidity (money) into the system, or at least the impact rates of doing so have become very low (see this post on the German problem)
continue reading
Why Worry About Japan?
Well I can think of several reasons, and none of them particularly related to the lamentable lack of security at nuclear power stations that was recently revealed there.
One good reason to worry might be the use and abuse of economic statistics that goes on in the Japanese context. I don’t know whether it is the fact that the Japanese economy is a topic which the majority of English language readers know so little about that means that normal caution is thrown to the winds, or whether Japanese obscurantism with the numbers themselves is the real culprit.
continue reading
The Netherlands
Netherlands only European country where emigrants outnumber immigrants
For a change I can offer some news from home. After a massive influx of immigrants during the 90´s the Netherlands finds out it has become an emigrant country. In first place to be exact. In front of some regular countries we associate with migration like Poland.
The net migration graph for 2005 shows some interesting developments. Although you need to correct these numbers for population (e.a Lithania still comes first if we were to look at the number of net migrants per 1000 inhabitants, Austria is also an interesting case on the other side of the spectrum).
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A Tall Story
This article from AP caught my eye:
Most of us are taller than our parents, who probably are taller than their parents. But in the Netherlands, the generational progression has reached new heights. In the last 150 years, the Dutch have become the tallest people on Earth — and experts say they're still getting bigger. It is a tale of a nation's health and wealth. With their protein-rich diet and a national health service that pampers infants, the Dutch are standing taller than ever. The average Dutchman stands just over 6 feet, while women average nearly 5-foot-7.
continue reading
For a change I can offer some news from home. After a massive influx of immigrants during the 90´s the Netherlands finds out it has become an emigrant country. In first place to be exact. In front of some regular countries we associate with migration like Poland.
The net migration graph for 2005 shows some interesting developments. Although you need to correct these numbers for population (e.a Lithania still comes first if we were to look at the number of net migrants per 1000 inhabitants, Austria is also an interesting case on the other side of the spectrum).
continue reading
A Tall Story
This article from AP caught my eye:
Most of us are taller than our parents, who probably are taller than their parents. But in the Netherlands, the generational progression has reached new heights. In the last 150 years, the Dutch have become the tallest people on Earth — and experts say they're still getting bigger. It is a tale of a nation's health and wealth. With their protein-rich diet and a national health service that pampers infants, the Dutch are standing taller than ever. The average Dutchman stands just over 6 feet, while women average nearly 5-foot-7.
continue reading
Denmark
Danish Population
Well, maybe this is just one way of saying that Claus is doing some guest posting over at A Fistful of Euros. The principal theme of Claus's firt post is flexicurity and the Danish labour market model, but the issue of migration in and out of Denmark has rapidly emerged in the comments. This, of course, got me digging around.
Now for all the proclaimed openness, I have to say that I didn't find the Danish statistics office site among the most user friendly I have come across of late. Nonetheless there is a micro-database, and if you ask the right questions you can get the answers you are looking for. Like migration for q4 2005: immigrants 9,869, emmigrants 10,076, net-migration thus was a negative outflow of 207 people. This needs to be put in the context of a population which now has very slow natural growth (1,637 in q4 2005). Now these numbers may seem comparatively small, but they need to be contextualised by the fact that Denmark is a comparatively small country (total popn q4 2005 5,425,420).
continue reading
Well, maybe this is just one way of saying that Claus is doing some guest posting over at A Fistful of Euros. The principal theme of Claus's firt post is flexicurity and the Danish labour market model, but the issue of migration in and out of Denmark has rapidly emerged in the comments. This, of course, got me digging around.
Now for all the proclaimed openness, I have to say that I didn't find the Danish statistics office site among the most user friendly I have come across of late. Nonetheless there is a micro-database, and if you ask the right questions you can get the answers you are looking for. Like migration for q4 2005: immigrants 9,869, emmigrants 10,076, net-migration thus was a negative outflow of 207 people. This needs to be put in the context of a population which now has very slow natural growth (1,637 in q4 2005). Now these numbers may seem comparatively small, but they need to be contextualised by the fact that Denmark is a comparatively small country (total popn q4 2005 5,425,420).
continue reading
Birth Postponement
Birth Postponement
Birth postponement, which is defined as an increase in the age at which women give birth to their first child, is now a widespread, and indeed near universal, phenomenon across the OECD countries. In Western, Northern, and Southern Europe, first-time mothers are on average 26 to 29 years old, up from 23 to 25 years at the start of the 1970s. In a number of European countries (Spain), the mean age of women at first childbirth has now even crossed the 30 year threshold.
This process is not restricted to Europe. Asia, Japan and the United States are all seeing average age at first birth on the rise, and increasingly the process is spreading to countries in the developing world like China, Turkey and Iran.
continue reading
First birth trends in developed countries: Persisting parenthood postponement
evels and trends of various facets concerning first births are continuously changing. The evidence confirms that the postponement of first births is an ongoing and persisting process which started in western countries among cohorts of the 1940s, but only in the 1960s cohorts in Central and Eastern Europe. The mean age of women having first births is universally rising. Fertility of older women was increasing. The decline in childbearing of young women is robust among the cohorts of the late 1960s and the 1970s; in Southern Europe as well as in central and Eastern Europe the rates of decline have accelerated. Childbearing behavior in the formerly socialist countries is in transition to a different regime.
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Postponement of Childbearing in Europe
The subject matter of this conference forms the core of the second chapter of my book, which you can find here.
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The Postponement of Childbearing in Europe
At the present time some 66 countries have fertility rates which are below the level necessary for population replacement (TFR 2.1). Within the next decade the number of counries in this group is set to grow to the point where a majority of the world’s population will be living in regions where the existing population no longer replaces itself. This development in an of itself is no disaster - many countries arguably suffer from excessive rates of population increase - but equally reducing fertility too rapidly can lead to economic and social 'imbalances' that may well turn out to be, in and of themselves, 'undesireable'.
continue reading
The Postponement In Childbearing
All the indications point to the possibility that sometime within the next decade the majority of the world’s population will find itself living in regions of the globe which have either near-replacement or below-replacement levels of fertility. What were previously thought of as distinct fertility regimes, with a strong distinction being drawn between fertility in "developed" and "developing" societies, are increasingly coming to be seen as forming part one single fertility phenomenon (Bongaarts and Bulatao 2000; Lutz et al. 2001; Wilson 2001).
continue reading
Postponement of childbearing and low fertility in Europe
Douglas Coupland’s novel Generation X, published with an appreciable success in 1991, portrays the story of three young people in their twenties who quit their jobs, leave their hometowns, and settle down in a small town in the Californian desert. They are ‘overeducated’ individuals, overloaded with information, and shaped by the consumer culture, yet totally lacking the career ambitions and family values of their parents’ generation. Andy, Claire, and Dag survive on low-paid ‘McJobs’, are strongly individualistic—practically to the point of being unable to develop lasting relationship—and feel alienated and ambiguous about the future. Their lives are conspicuous in their almost complete absence of family and children; their parents, typically divorced, are mentally and geographically worlds apart. Having children apparently does not belong to the options considered by the characters, who live in their own inner worlds.
Hardly any other novel better epitomises the cultural and social change, which has occurred in the course of one generation and turned the perception of many traditional values on family and reproduction upside down. For many young men and women in developed societies, marrying and having children has become a matter of choice, the possibility of a distant future. They live in an uncertain world which values flexibility and which is marked by impermanence—in employment, consumer products, and intimate relationships. Women have gained almost complete independence from men through receiving higher education and participating massively in paid labour, and have been freed from unintended pregnancies by a broad range of modern contraceptives. Men often seem to retreat from partnership and childrearing commitments, preferring spending money on consumer goods or pursuing a career instead (Goldscheider and Kaufman 1996). In the light of these shifts, it comes as no surprise that most developed societies have low or very low fertility rates and that women are having children at progressively higher ages. What is surprising, however, is the pace of these changes.
continue reading
Birth postponement, which is defined as an increase in the age at which women give birth to their first child, is now a widespread, and indeed near universal, phenomenon across the OECD countries. In Western, Northern, and Southern Europe, first-time mothers are on average 26 to 29 years old, up from 23 to 25 years at the start of the 1970s. In a number of European countries (Spain), the mean age of women at first childbirth has now even crossed the 30 year threshold.
This process is not restricted to Europe. Asia, Japan and the United States are all seeing average age at first birth on the rise, and increasingly the process is spreading to countries in the developing world like China, Turkey and Iran.
continue reading
First birth trends in developed countries: Persisting parenthood postponement
evels and trends of various facets concerning first births are continuously changing. The evidence confirms that the postponement of first births is an ongoing and persisting process which started in western countries among cohorts of the 1940s, but only in the 1960s cohorts in Central and Eastern Europe. The mean age of women having first births is universally rising. Fertility of older women was increasing. The decline in childbearing of young women is robust among the cohorts of the late 1960s and the 1970s; in Southern Europe as well as in central and Eastern Europe the rates of decline have accelerated. Childbearing behavior in the formerly socialist countries is in transition to a different regime.
continue reading
Postponement of Childbearing in Europe
The Vienna Institute of Demography, the Università Bocconi, and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) together with the Working Group on the Second Demographic Transition in Europe of the European Association for Population Studies held a conference on the Postponement of Childbearing in Europe at the Statistics Austria centre in Vienna on 1-3 December 2005. The conference brought together most of the world's leading experts on this topic, and on this page you can find links to, and comments on, what I consider to have been the most interesting papers.
continue reading
The Postponement of Childbearing in Europe
At the present time some 66 countries have fertility rates which are below the level necessary for population replacement (TFR 2.1). Within the next decade the number of counries in this group is set to grow to the point where a majority of the world’s population will be living in regions where the existing population no longer replaces itself. This development in an of itself is no disaster - many countries arguably suffer from excessive rates of population increase - but equally reducing fertility too rapidly can lead to economic and social 'imbalances' that may well turn out to be, in and of themselves, 'undesireable'.
continue reading
The Postponement In Childbearing
All the indications point to the possibility that sometime within the next decade the majority of the world’s population will find itself living in regions of the globe which have either near-replacement or below-replacement levels of fertility. What were previously thought of as distinct fertility regimes, with a strong distinction being drawn between fertility in "developed" and "developing" societies, are increasingly coming to be seen as forming part one single fertility phenomenon (Bongaarts and Bulatao 2000; Lutz et al. 2001; Wilson 2001).
continue reading
Postponement of childbearing and low fertility in Europe
Douglas Coupland’s novel Generation X, published with an appreciable success in 1991, portrays the story of three young people in their twenties who quit their jobs, leave their hometowns, and settle down in a small town in the Californian desert. They are ‘overeducated’ individuals, overloaded with information, and shaped by the consumer culture, yet totally lacking the career ambitions and family values of their parents’ generation. Andy, Claire, and Dag survive on low-paid ‘McJobs’, are strongly individualistic—practically to the point of being unable to develop lasting relationship—and feel alienated and ambiguous about the future. Their lives are conspicuous in their almost complete absence of family and children; their parents, typically divorced, are mentally and geographically worlds apart. Having children apparently does not belong to the options considered by the characters, who live in their own inner worlds.
Hardly any other novel better epitomises the cultural and social change, which has occurred in the course of one generation and turned the perception of many traditional values on family and reproduction upside down. For many young men and women in developed societies, marrying and having children has become a matter of choice, the possibility of a distant future. They live in an uncertain world which values flexibility and which is marked by impermanence—in employment, consumer products, and intimate relationships. Women have gained almost complete independence from men through receiving higher education and participating massively in paid labour, and have been freed from unintended pregnancies by a broad range of modern contraceptives. Men often seem to retreat from partnership and childrearing commitments, preferring spending money on consumer goods or pursuing a career instead (Goldscheider and Kaufman 1996). In the light of these shifts, it comes as no surprise that most developed societies have low or very low fertility rates and that women are having children at progressively higher ages. What is surprising, however, is the pace of these changes.
continue reading
China
Two Papers on Chinese Fertility
Not too long ago we had a discussion on Chinese fertility and as often before the discussion converged on just what theTFR level is in China as well as the effects of the one child policy. This entry fields two papers which might serve to illuminate these issues. Both papers are from recent issues of Population and Development Review.
The first paper examines the very important point of heterogenity across China in terms of application and effect of the one child policy.
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Fertility in China
Claus mailed me this morning with a link to this article from the BBC:
China's top family planning body has warned of a "population rebound" as couples flout one child policy rules. The widening wealth gap could lead to a rise in birth rates, Zhang Weiqing, from the National Population and Family Planning Commission, told state media. Newly rich couples can afford to pay fines to have more than one child, while rural couples are marrying earlier, he told Xinhua news agency.
As Claus indicated to me in his mail all of this is something of an oversimplification:
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China To Retain One Child Policy
This is not good news:
China has decided not to relax its one-child policy, although a top family planning official acknowledged Tuesday the policy has accelerated the nation's growing gender gap. ... Yet after a review last month, he said, the government decided to maintain the policy, which dates from the late 1970s, and limits urban couples to one child and rural families to two children. Dropping the restrictions now would risk a population surge as a baby boomer generation born in the early 1980s becomes ready to start families, he said.
Now let me be very clear at this point. China needs to introduce pro-natalist policies, and it needs to introduce them urgently. The discourse on sex-imbalances is important, but in this context it is an entirely secondary issue.
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China's demographic uncertainties
Claus' post on the consequences China's economic and demographic issues is important. If the demographic statistics reflect reality, then China is destined to face these problems in these acute forms. The problem, as Andy Mukherjee went on to write in an article published by Bloomberg on 16 February of this year, is that they may well not.
Wolfgang Lutz, who runs the population-research program at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in Laxenburg, Austria, is studying the range of uncertainty in China's future population trends. Lutz and his colleagues have identified at least 32 different estimates for the current fertility rate in Chinese women.
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The ageing of China and a methodological approach to countries' vulnerability to ageing
When we speak about China and demographics we often evoke the question of whether China will grow old before it grows rich. Many scholars and researchers have tried and are trying to answer this question and one of the more elaborate and interesting answers comes from The Development Bank Research Bulletin.
"China has one of the longest life expectancy among low-income countries. This was seen as a major achievement compared to Africa, but now it starts to become a problem. By 2040, the UN projects that the share of elderly in Chinese population will rise to 28%. By then, there will be 397 million Chinese elders, which is more than the total current population of France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom combined. Among them 100 million will be over 80 years ago, who are very likely to be disabled in some ways.
continue reading
Not too long ago we had a discussion on Chinese fertility and as often before the discussion converged on just what theTFR level is in China as well as the effects of the one child policy. This entry fields two papers which might serve to illuminate these issues. Both papers are from recent issues of Population and Development Review.
The first paper examines the very important point of heterogenity across China in terms of application and effect of the one child policy.
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Fertility in China
Claus mailed me this morning with a link to this article from the BBC:
China's top family planning body has warned of a "population rebound" as couples flout one child policy rules. The widening wealth gap could lead to a rise in birth rates, Zhang Weiqing, from the National Population and Family Planning Commission, told state media. Newly rich couples can afford to pay fines to have more than one child, while rural couples are marrying earlier, he told Xinhua news agency.
As Claus indicated to me in his mail all of this is something of an oversimplification:
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China To Retain One Child Policy
This is not good news:
China has decided not to relax its one-child policy, although a top family planning official acknowledged Tuesday the policy has accelerated the nation's growing gender gap. ... Yet after a review last month, he said, the government decided to maintain the policy, which dates from the late 1970s, and limits urban couples to one child and rural families to two children. Dropping the restrictions now would risk a population surge as a baby boomer generation born in the early 1980s becomes ready to start families, he said.
Now let me be very clear at this point. China needs to introduce pro-natalist policies, and it needs to introduce them urgently. The discourse on sex-imbalances is important, but in this context it is an entirely secondary issue.
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China's demographic uncertainties
Claus' post on the consequences China's economic and demographic issues is important. If the demographic statistics reflect reality, then China is destined to face these problems in these acute forms. The problem, as Andy Mukherjee went on to write in an article published by Bloomberg on 16 February of this year, is that they may well not.
Wolfgang Lutz, who runs the population-research program at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in Laxenburg, Austria, is studying the range of uncertainty in China's future population trends. Lutz and his colleagues have identified at least 32 different estimates for the current fertility rate in Chinese women.
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The ageing of China and a methodological approach to countries' vulnerability to ageing
When we speak about China and demographics we often evoke the question of whether China will grow old before it grows rich. Many scholars and researchers have tried and are trying to answer this question and one of the more elaborate and interesting answers comes from The Development Bank Research Bulletin.
"China has one of the longest life expectancy among low-income countries. This was seen as a major achievement compared to Africa, but now it starts to become a problem. By 2040, the UN projects that the share of elderly in Chinese population will rise to 28%. By then, there will be 397 million Chinese elders, which is more than the total current population of France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom combined. Among them 100 million will be over 80 years ago, who are very likely to be disabled in some ways.
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Iceland
Iceland Is Interesting
The Icelandic economy has been in the news a lot recently. I guess everyone has already read something or other about this, if not Claus has a post here (and here) which gives background and links.
Now basically up till today I had given the Iceland 'problem' a rather wide birth, since I think it is, at the end of the day (and with full apologies in advance to all Icelanders) 'pretty small lava'. And since my global imbalances theoretical model doesn't follow the well-trodden Roubini-Setser path (and since euro weakness means the dollar can't possibly fall), and since I don't think you need to treat every fresh crisis as just one more example of your own pet thesis, and since anyway I have enough on my plate right now, I thought, well, let's give this party a miss. There will be plenty more later.
continue reading
The Icelandic economy has been in the news a lot recently. I guess everyone has already read something or other about this, if not Claus has a post here (and here) which gives background and links.
Now basically up till today I had given the Iceland 'problem' a rather wide birth, since I think it is, at the end of the day (and with full apologies in advance to all Icelanders) 'pretty small lava'. And since my global imbalances theoretical model doesn't follow the well-trodden Roubini-Setser path (and since euro weakness means the dollar can't possibly fall), and since I don't think you need to treat every fresh crisis as just one more example of your own pet thesis, and since anyway I have enough on my plate right now, I thought, well, let's give this party a miss. There will be plenty more later.
continue reading
Ageing Populations
Ben Bernanke and the Coming Demographic Transition
Ben Bernanke's speech yesterday should prove interesting for all readers of Demography Matters. The speech is interesting not so much for his views on the US social security system as such, but for the way he conceptualises the problem. This IMHO is a huge step forward. We are in the midst of an ongoing demographic transition. Here are some extracts:
The Coming Demographic Transition: Will We Treat Future Generations Fairly?
In coming decades, many forces will shape our economy and our society, but in all likelihood no single factor will have as pervasive an effect as the aging of our population.
This coming demographic transition is the result both of the reduction in fertility that followed the post-World War II baby boom and of ongoing increases in life expectancy. Although demographers expect U.S. fertility rates to remain close to current levels for the foreseeable future, life expectancy is projected to continue rising. As a consequence, the anticipated increase in the share of the population aged sixty-five or older is not simply the result of the retirement of the baby boomers; the "pig in a python" image often used to describe the effects of that generation on U.S. demographics is misleading. Instead, over the next few decades the U.S. population is expected to become progressively older and remain so, even as the baby-boom generation passes from the scene. As you may know, population aging is also occurring in many other countries. Indeed, many of these countries are further along than the United States in this process and have already begun to experience more fully some of its social and economic implications.
continue reading
I'm new here, so I think it's good to start by writing about what awoke me personally to the issue of ageing populations. About pension bombs and dependency ratios I had heard before, but it took one course book, about three years ago, to realise that there's much more involved than that. In fact, the book I read gave it only one chapter -but it was written by Peter Drucker, and he can be quite convincing. (In this one, the Mediterranean reality, for example, is described as that of "collective national suicides".)
continue reading
Ericsson Offers Redundancy To Workers In The 35 to 50 Age Group
Well, I think this certainly is news. And it fits in with the findings of ongoing research from Italian economist Francesco Daveri. See especially working paper 309: "Age, technology and labour costs", which examines the case of Finland and especially Nokia (available on this page, abstract pasted at the bottom of this post).
Ericsson, the telecoms equipment maker, on Monday offered a voluntary redundancy package to up to 1,000 of its Sweden-based employees between the ages of 35 and 50. The unprecedented move is designed to make way for younger workers.
continue reading
So, you think you can fix the demographic crisis, right?
The spirit of procastination having taken possession of me, and with Google at my fingertips, I decided to abuse numbers in a most outrageous way. What follows is, at best, statistical fiction (one day I want to help write the U.S. budget, which is the Da Vinci Code of statistics: everybody knows it's fiction, from the writers to the critics, except the clueless millions who don't).
continue reading
An Ageing Problem?
In a comment on CAP TvK's Ageing in the EU 25 post David Friedman said:
"Progress in biological knowledge has been very rapid in the past century, so it wouldn't be surprising if, well before 2050, the aging problem was solved."
Here there are two issues: that improvements in biological knowledge can lead to longer, more productive lives, and that ageing is a problem, and indeed a problem that has a solution. This post will adress the latter issue.
continue reading
Ageing in the EU25: a short introduction.
For those who are interested in the current situation on ageing in the EU region. This recent EC paper "The economic impact of ageing populations in the EU25 Member States", gives a good and concise overview. The first part is a summary of what we know about the impact of ageing on the labour supply, input, capital intensity, TFP and indirect budgetary effects.
The 2nd part goes into the projections for all the EU-25 members. It also gives three distinct time periods the EU zone will go through
continue reading
Older Workers In The UK Continue Working
This news from the FT today is very interesting indeed:
More than half the jobs created in the past year were filled by people above the state pension age, according to official statistics.
The rise in the number of working older people reflected increasing financial pressures created by pensions shortfalls and a growing willingness of employers to take on older staff, employers’ organisations said.
continue reading
Greying in Liguria
This article in the IHT provides an interesting insight into how the ageing process is affecting one region of Italy, the Liguria region whose capital is Genoa. Probably the idea of NO children in the streets is something of an exaggeration, but the main picture is clear:
There are hundreds of stores in the Fiumara Mall - Sephora, Elan, Lavazza Café. But in a nation long known for its hordes of children, there is not one toy store in the sprawling mix, and a shiny merry-go-round stands dormant.
continue reading
Czech Pensions
I just found this article from the Prague Daily Monitor via a link on an interesting looking website called Age Times. It is pretty wooly, but the fact that the Czech pension system is already going into deficit does start ringing alarm bells. The problem obviously can only get worse if they don't have a substantial reform, but to have anything more to say I think I will need to look into this a bit further.
continue reading
US: The Coming Demographic Tsunami
Well, reading through this account of a recent speech by David M. Walker, head of the US Government Accountability Office, I have only one thing to say: Demography Really Does Matter.
Walker has committed himself "to touring the nation through the 2008 elections, talking to anybody who will listen about the fiscal black hole Washington has dug itself, the "demographic tsunami" that will come when the baby boom generation begins retiring and the recklessness of borrowing money from foreign lenders to pay for the operation of the U.S. government".
continue reading
Ben Bernanke's speech yesterday should prove interesting for all readers of Demography Matters. The speech is interesting not so much for his views on the US social security system as such, but for the way he conceptualises the problem. This IMHO is a huge step forward. We are in the midst of an ongoing demographic transition. Here are some extracts:
The Coming Demographic Transition: Will We Treat Future Generations Fairly?
In coming decades, many forces will shape our economy and our society, but in all likelihood no single factor will have as pervasive an effect as the aging of our population.
This coming demographic transition is the result both of the reduction in fertility that followed the post-World War II baby boom and of ongoing increases in life expectancy. Although demographers expect U.S. fertility rates to remain close to current levels for the foreseeable future, life expectancy is projected to continue rising. As a consequence, the anticipated increase in the share of the population aged sixty-five or older is not simply the result of the retirement of the baby boomers; the "pig in a python" image often used to describe the effects of that generation on U.S. demographics is misleading. Instead, over the next few decades the U.S. population is expected to become progressively older and remain so, even as the baby-boom generation passes from the scene. As you may know, population aging is also occurring in many other countries. Indeed, many of these countries are further along than the United States in this process and have already begun to experience more fully some of its social and economic implications.
continue reading
Peter Drucker on Demography
Could microeconomics help us out?I'm new here, so I think it's good to start by writing about what awoke me personally to the issue of ageing populations. About pension bombs and dependency ratios I had heard before, but it took one course book, about three years ago, to realise that there's much more involved than that. In fact, the book I read gave it only one chapter -but it was written by Peter Drucker, and he can be quite convincing. (In this one, the Mediterranean reality, for example, is described as that of "collective national suicides".)
continue reading
Ericsson Offers Redundancy To Workers In The 35 to 50 Age Group
Well, I think this certainly is news. And it fits in with the findings of ongoing research from Italian economist Francesco Daveri. See especially working paper 309: "Age, technology and labour costs", which examines the case of Finland and especially Nokia (available on this page, abstract pasted at the bottom of this post).
Ericsson, the telecoms equipment maker, on Monday offered a voluntary redundancy package to up to 1,000 of its Sweden-based employees between the ages of 35 and 50. The unprecedented move is designed to make way for younger workers.
continue reading
So, you think you can fix the demographic crisis, right?
The spirit of procastination having taken possession of me, and with Google at my fingertips, I decided to abuse numbers in a most outrageous way. What follows is, at best, statistical fiction (one day I want to help write the U.S. budget, which is the Da Vinci Code of statistics: everybody knows it's fiction, from the writers to the critics, except the clueless millions who don't).
continue reading
An Ageing Problem?
In a comment on CAP TvK's Ageing in the EU 25 post David Friedman said:
"Progress in biological knowledge has been very rapid in the past century, so it wouldn't be surprising if, well before 2050, the aging problem was solved."
Here there are two issues: that improvements in biological knowledge can lead to longer, more productive lives, and that ageing is a problem, and indeed a problem that has a solution. This post will adress the latter issue.
continue reading
Ageing in the EU25: a short introduction.
For those who are interested in the current situation on ageing in the EU region. This recent EC paper "The economic impact of ageing populations in the EU25 Member States", gives a good and concise overview. The first part is a summary of what we know about the impact of ageing on the labour supply, input, capital intensity, TFP and indirect budgetary effects.
The 2nd part goes into the projections for all the EU-25 members. It also gives three distinct time periods the EU zone will go through
continue reading
Older Workers In The UK Continue Working
This news from the FT today is very interesting indeed:
More than half the jobs created in the past year were filled by people above the state pension age, according to official statistics.
The rise in the number of working older people reflected increasing financial pressures created by pensions shortfalls and a growing willingness of employers to take on older staff, employers’ organisations said.
continue reading
Greying in Liguria
This article in the IHT provides an interesting insight into how the ageing process is affecting one region of Italy, the Liguria region whose capital is Genoa. Probably the idea of NO children in the streets is something of an exaggeration, but the main picture is clear:
There are hundreds of stores in the Fiumara Mall - Sephora, Elan, Lavazza Café. But in a nation long known for its hordes of children, there is not one toy store in the sprawling mix, and a shiny merry-go-round stands dormant.
continue reading
Czech Pensions
I just found this article from the Prague Daily Monitor via a link on an interesting looking website called Age Times. It is pretty wooly, but the fact that the Czech pension system is already going into deficit does start ringing alarm bells. The problem obviously can only get worse if they don't have a substantial reform, but to have anything more to say I think I will need to look into this a bit further.
continue reading
US: The Coming Demographic Tsunami
Well, reading through this account of a recent speech by David M. Walker, head of the US Government Accountability Office, I have only one thing to say: Demography Really Does Matter.
Walker has committed himself "to touring the nation through the 2008 elections, talking to anybody who will listen about the fiscal black hole Washington has dug itself, the "demographic tsunami" that will come when the baby boom generation begins retiring and the recklessness of borrowing money from foreign lenders to pay for the operation of the U.S. government".
continue reading
The Demographic Transition
Ben Bernanke and the Coming Demographic Transition
Ben Bernanke's speech yesterday should prove interesting for all readers of Demography Matters. The speech is interesting not so much for his views on the US social security system as such, but for the way he conceptualises the problem. This IMHO is a huge step forward. We are in the midst of an ongoing demographic transition. Here are some extracts:
The Coming Demographic Transition: Will We Treat Future Generations Fairly?
In coming decades, many forces will shape our economy and our society, but in all likelihood no single factor will have as pervasive an effect as the aging of our population.
This coming demographic transition is the result both of the reduction in fertility that followed the post-World War II baby boom and of ongoing increases in life expectancy. Although demographers expect U.S. fertility rates to remain close to current levels for the foreseeable future, life expectancy is projected to continue rising. As a consequence, the anticipated increase in the share of the population aged sixty-five or older is not simply the result of the retirement of the baby boomers; the "pig in a python" image often used to describe the effects of that generation on U.S. demographics is misleading. Instead, over the next few decades the U.S. population is expected to become progressively older and remain so, even as the baby-boom generation passes from the scene. As you may know, population aging is also occurring in many other countries. Indeed, many of these countries are further along than the United States in this process and have already begun to experience more fully some of its social and economic implications.
continue reading
The Demographic Transition
The 21st century will doubtless bear witness to a great many new and strange phenomena, but somewhere high up on the list of things which defined the century will surely be the fact that most countries experienced a substantial and sustained ageing in their populations as the century progressed. This population ageing is the result of both a general decline in birth rates and a sustained and substantial increase in levels of life expectancy. In the developed world birth rates will in all likelihood continue to sustain below replacement levels of fertility (with 'just how low can you go' being still very much an open question) whilst the developing countries are, and will continue to be, in the process of dropping from high to moderate and then eventually to low, or even extremely low, fertility levels.
continue reading
Rethinking the Demographic Transition
It was the late Imre Lakatos who used to argue that the important question to ask about any research program was whether it was in its progressive or in its degenerative stage. For Lakatos a progressive research program was characterised by growth and the discovery of new and interesting facts whilst a degenerative one was marked by a lack of growth, and by an excessive increase in what he termed the "protective belt" which surrounds the program, and in particular a degenerative programme is one which finds itself continually forced to respond to an ever-growing list of counter-examples and nuances (Lakatos,2000.1976, 1970). On this view auxiliary hypotheses finally end-up being tacked-on to the original theory in an increasingly adhoc-ocratic fashion. At some stage in the process a turning point is reached where it becomes on-balance more and more interesting to abandon the old and break-open the new. What has all of this got to do with demographic transition theory, well, I think posing the question is already, at least in part, to answer it.
continue reading
Bo Malmberg's Theory Of Stages
The Swedish demographer Bo Malmberg has proposed a four-phase typology of the demographic transition which may be considered to be a useful contribution to our understanding of the age structure impacts of the ongoing processes of social and economic evolution which accompany the demographic transition (Malmberg and Sommestad, 2000).
The modern demographic transition has, of course, had a substantial influence on both population-size and population growth-rates over the last two centuries, and it is probably this aspect of the transition more than any other which has grabbed the popular attention, at least until very recent times. Less well appreciated and less well publicised, however, has been the fact that the impact of the transition on the age structure of populations has been equally strong and significant. It is this age-structure dimension which Bo Malmberg, more perhaps than any other demographer, has thought about and has attempted to capture theoretically.
Impacts on age structure tend to be more extended in time than their more dramatic size-impact equivalents, and indeed one might claim that the whole process of the demographic transition in-and-of itself is best thought of as an extended and continuous process of age-transition. This is Malmberg's principle insight.
continue reading
Ben Bernanke's speech yesterday should prove interesting for all readers of Demography Matters. The speech is interesting not so much for his views on the US social security system as such, but for the way he conceptualises the problem. This IMHO is a huge step forward. We are in the midst of an ongoing demographic transition. Here are some extracts:
The Coming Demographic Transition: Will We Treat Future Generations Fairly?
In coming decades, many forces will shape our economy and our society, but in all likelihood no single factor will have as pervasive an effect as the aging of our population.
This coming demographic transition is the result both of the reduction in fertility that followed the post-World War II baby boom and of ongoing increases in life expectancy. Although demographers expect U.S. fertility rates to remain close to current levels for the foreseeable future, life expectancy is projected to continue rising. As a consequence, the anticipated increase in the share of the population aged sixty-five or older is not simply the result of the retirement of the baby boomers; the "pig in a python" image often used to describe the effects of that generation on U.S. demographics is misleading. Instead, over the next few decades the U.S. population is expected to become progressively older and remain so, even as the baby-boom generation passes from the scene. As you may know, population aging is also occurring in many other countries. Indeed, many of these countries are further along than the United States in this process and have already begun to experience more fully some of its social and economic implications.
continue reading
The Demographic Transition
The 21st century will doubtless bear witness to a great many new and strange phenomena, but somewhere high up on the list of things which defined the century will surely be the fact that most countries experienced a substantial and sustained ageing in their populations as the century progressed. This population ageing is the result of both a general decline in birth rates and a sustained and substantial increase in levels of life expectancy. In the developed world birth rates will in all likelihood continue to sustain below replacement levels of fertility (with 'just how low can you go' being still very much an open question) whilst the developing countries are, and will continue to be, in the process of dropping from high to moderate and then eventually to low, or even extremely low, fertility levels.
continue reading
Rethinking the Demographic Transition
It was the late Imre Lakatos who used to argue that the important question to ask about any research program was whether it was in its progressive or in its degenerative stage. For Lakatos a progressive research program was characterised by growth and the discovery of new and interesting facts whilst a degenerative one was marked by a lack of growth, and by an excessive increase in what he termed the "protective belt" which surrounds the program, and in particular a degenerative programme is one which finds itself continually forced to respond to an ever-growing list of counter-examples and nuances (Lakatos,2000.1976, 1970). On this view auxiliary hypotheses finally end-up being tacked-on to the original theory in an increasingly adhoc-ocratic fashion. At some stage in the process a turning point is reached where it becomes on-balance more and more interesting to abandon the old and break-open the new. What has all of this got to do with demographic transition theory, well, I think posing the question is already, at least in part, to answer it.
continue reading
Bo Malmberg's Theory Of Stages
The Swedish demographer Bo Malmberg has proposed a four-phase typology of the demographic transition which may be considered to be a useful contribution to our understanding of the age structure impacts of the ongoing processes of social and economic evolution which accompany the demographic transition (Malmberg and Sommestad, 2000).
The modern demographic transition has, of course, had a substantial influence on both population-size and population growth-rates over the last two centuries, and it is probably this aspect of the transition more than any other which has grabbed the popular attention, at least until very recent times. Less well appreciated and less well publicised, however, has been the fact that the impact of the transition on the age structure of populations has been equally strong and significant. It is this age-structure dimension which Bo Malmberg, more perhaps than any other demographer, has thought about and has attempted to capture theoretically.
Impacts on age structure tend to be more extended in time than their more dramatic size-impact equivalents, and indeed one might claim that the whole process of the demographic transition in-and-of itself is best thought of as an extended and continuous process of age-transition. This is Malmberg's principle insight.
continue reading
Growth Theory
Neo-Classical Growth?
Is there, or isn't there an ageing impact on our economies? Well one way of addressing this issue is to look at the recent economic performance of some of those who are most directly affected. Now one of the key postulates of neo-classical growth theory is that each economy has its own long run steady state growth rate. This is in many ways a highly questionable assumption and is one which, with the notable exception of the US, is very hard to sustain empirically over the longer term. Economic performance tends to fluctuate, the big question is: does it fluctuate following any kind of identifiable pattern?
continue reading
Demographics and an Overheated India?
There has certainly been much debate and discussion lately about what has been known as India's sizzling growth rates whether this rampant pace of the Indian economy is sustainable or whether in fact the economy was on its way to overheat and perhaps even collaps. More interestingly, this discussion has pitted our very Edward and his Indian colleagues over at the Indian Economy Blog against no other than the hegemoneous English magazine the Economist. As such, if you have been following the readings in the Economist as of late the journal has on several occasions pointed to the worrying signs of India's economic growth. A week ago the Economics Focus column featured two studies which compared economic growth in India and China; both of them by Barry Bosworth and Susan M. Collins from the Brookings Institution; 1) Accounting for Growth: Comparing India and China and 2) Sources of Growth in the Indian Economy. And the conclusion as quoted from the Economist Economics Focus column.
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US Fertilty and Growth, A Research Agenda
Possibly some could accuse me - and probably with good reason - of being obsessed with the US fertility issue (see this post which was a first pass at the issue, and this one by Claus). I think what is happening on the fertility front in the US is important for all of us since the US fertility situation is more or less unique in the OECD world, and possibly will become even more unique as an increasing number of developing countries attain below replacement (and possibly even lowest-low) ferility. The examples of the Asian tigers, China, Thailand, the Southernmost (and economically most succesful) Indian States (Kerala, Tamil Nadu) should give us serious food for thought on this count.
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Economic Growth In The OCED
Claus is right to draw our attention to the OECD factbook. There is a lot of useful data to be found there. I have just found this useful graph of economic growth in the OECD since the start of the ninetees:
A number of non OECD countries have been added by the OECD - China, India, Brazil - and this makes the picture even clearer. Almost all the elderly societies - Japan, Germany, Italy, Switzerland - have been experiencing low growth, and over a comparatively long period of time. At the other end, those countries getting a boost from their demographic dividend have been having comparatively high growth (Ireland included). Including the first half of the ninetees may even blurr the contrast a little, since the situation has been most pronounced over the last decade. (Full stats on annual growth rates over this time can be found in this pdf). The situation is further complicated by the evolution of the East and Central European EU accession states, which although ageing comparatively rapidly, have been having a 'catching-up' growth boost due to their coupling with the rest of the EU. Their growth evolution will be an important area of interest in the next few years.
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The Malthusian Trap and Growth Theory
In almost all posts here on DM we highlight in some way or another the potential negative effects of a declining population in either regions or whole countries. Particularly, we have argued in the context of Italy and notably Japan that declining and ageing population are likely to have an impact ... but an impact on what? Well quite frankly let us just call it 'growth' in its widest economic sense. Now, (and very briefly) in economics we have two broad measures of looking at the growth of the economy; short term and long term. The short term definition of growth in economic output centers around business cycle analysis where actual output grows either above or beyond a trend path. In terms of growth in the long run we are interested in the rate and change of real income of real output which centers around the idea of the steady state which in fact is the long-run equilibrium in growth theory.
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The Economics of Demographics
This one is a real treat for anyone simultaneoulsy interested in demographics and economics and as such also a treat for the DM team and hopefully for our faithful readers as well. What am I talking about then? In short, the IMF has chosen to devote their Septemper issue of Finance and Development to 'The Economics of Demographics' and obviously this cannot go un-noticed here. On that note we should thank fellow blogger Pienso for brining the IMF publication to our attention via E-Mail. So what do we have here?
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Immigration, Demographics, and Economics
Over the past few years, I have studied demographics and the economics of globalization and practiced to what extent I could through my jobs. What interests me most about the current state of demographic change throughout the world – is the fact that because of globalization, for the first time international migration has become a significant variable in how these changes translate into economic growth. To put it another way, the graying of parts of the world and population explosions in others can both be mitigated by net positive or net negative international migration, respectively.
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A Demographic Divide?
In the post below Edward discusses the demographics of Nigeria and more specifically how economic growth also is effected by high fertility parallel with the situation of economic growth and low fertility which is perhaps more widely cited here at Demography.Matters. As Edward notes in relation to Nigeria and more generally in the context of many sub-Saharan Africa high fertility is at the heart of the growth issue. The point here is in fact the savings rate and crucially what we could call a Malthusian trap where all the income is used for consumption and thus there is no room savings/investment dynamics (capital accumulation). Robert E. Lucas also explains this process in terms of the growth feedback with Malthusian population dynamics.
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Nigeria Population Census Results
Well I don't have a lot to say about the details of the findings at this point (since among other things Thomas may want to say something), but as he suggested in this post, the Nigerian census results are now complete and published:
Nigeria's population is growing at an annual rate of 3.2 percent and stands at just over 140 million, a 63 percent increase in 15 years, population commission chairman Samu'ila Mukama has said.
"The total number of the Nigerian population is 140,003,542," Mukama announced in presenting the provisional results of the March 2006 census to President Olusegun Obasanjo in the federal capital Abuja on Friday.
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Message To Central Bankers: Target Median Ages!
Central bankers are all in a flurry right now, since they don't seem to be any too sure what it is they should be targeting, inflation or monetary aggregates. Well I have one piece of advice for them: keep your eyes on both of these (provided that is you know how to interpret the signals) but add one more objective (or pillar) to your list - population median age.
Sounds daft, doesn't it? What a silly idea Edward!Well no actually, it isn't. And the fact that most people in the macroeconomic community haven't appreciated the role and importance of this metric is one of the principal reasons why many observers are at such a loss to understand what is happening in Germany and Japan right now, and why the proponents of the so-called 'Goldilocks' recovery are discovering that there just isn't enough honey in the pot to go round (obviously some of it was eaten by one of those bears I mentioned in the last post). For a brief introduction to the macroeconomics of this problem, see this post from Claus (and then drill as far down as you want, one thing is for sure, you won't reach Australia, since Australia isn't on the list of countries with a preoccupyingly high median age, at least not just yet it isn't, which is why over at the Australian central bank they may like to take note of what I am saying while there is still time).
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Immigration, Ageing Populations and Economic Growth
Marty Feldstein has an article in the Financial Times today under the header "Immigration is no way to fund an ageing population". This is a strange coincidence since earlier this week I was busy posting on Italian Economy Watch about the boost given to economic growth in Italy in recent years by the growing numbers of immigrants who have been arriving there.
Now since I am arguing that immigration is in fact a significant policy tool which can be leveraged to address the problems raised by population ageing, a clear clash of opinions would seem to exist. So who is right here?
continue reading
Is there, or isn't there an ageing impact on our economies? Well one way of addressing this issue is to look at the recent economic performance of some of those who are most directly affected. Now one of the key postulates of neo-classical growth theory is that each economy has its own long run steady state growth rate. This is in many ways a highly questionable assumption and is one which, with the notable exception of the US, is very hard to sustain empirically over the longer term. Economic performance tends to fluctuate, the big question is: does it fluctuate following any kind of identifiable pattern?
continue reading
Demographics and an Overheated India?
There has certainly been much debate and discussion lately about what has been known as India's sizzling growth rates whether this rampant pace of the Indian economy is sustainable or whether in fact the economy was on its way to overheat and perhaps even collaps. More interestingly, this discussion has pitted our very Edward and his Indian colleagues over at the Indian Economy Blog against no other than the hegemoneous English magazine the Economist. As such, if you have been following the readings in the Economist as of late the journal has on several occasions pointed to the worrying signs of India's economic growth. A week ago the Economics Focus column featured two studies which compared economic growth in India and China; both of them by Barry Bosworth and Susan M. Collins from the Brookings Institution; 1) Accounting for Growth: Comparing India and China and 2) Sources of Growth in the Indian Economy. And the conclusion as quoted from the Economist Economics Focus column.
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US Fertilty and Growth, A Research Agenda
Possibly some could accuse me - and probably with good reason - of being obsessed with the US fertility issue (see this post which was a first pass at the issue, and this one by Claus). I think what is happening on the fertility front in the US is important for all of us since the US fertility situation is more or less unique in the OECD world, and possibly will become even more unique as an increasing number of developing countries attain below replacement (and possibly even lowest-low) ferility. The examples of the Asian tigers, China, Thailand, the Southernmost (and economically most succesful) Indian States (Kerala, Tamil Nadu) should give us serious food for thought on this count.
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Economic Growth In The OCED
Claus is right to draw our attention to the OECD factbook. There is a lot of useful data to be found there. I have just found this useful graph of economic growth in the OECD since the start of the ninetees:
A number of non OECD countries have been added by the OECD - China, India, Brazil - and this makes the picture even clearer. Almost all the elderly societies - Japan, Germany, Italy, Switzerland - have been experiencing low growth, and over a comparatively long period of time. At the other end, those countries getting a boost from their demographic dividend have been having comparatively high growth (Ireland included). Including the first half of the ninetees may even blurr the contrast a little, since the situation has been most pronounced over the last decade. (Full stats on annual growth rates over this time can be found in this pdf). The situation is further complicated by the evolution of the East and Central European EU accession states, which although ageing comparatively rapidly, have been having a 'catching-up' growth boost due to their coupling with the rest of the EU. Their growth evolution will be an important area of interest in the next few years.
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The Malthusian Trap and Growth Theory
In almost all posts here on DM we highlight in some way or another the potential negative effects of a declining population in either regions or whole countries. Particularly, we have argued in the context of Italy and notably Japan that declining and ageing population are likely to have an impact ... but an impact on what? Well quite frankly let us just call it 'growth' in its widest economic sense. Now, (and very briefly) in economics we have two broad measures of looking at the growth of the economy; short term and long term. The short term definition of growth in economic output centers around business cycle analysis where actual output grows either above or beyond a trend path. In terms of growth in the long run we are interested in the rate and change of real income of real output which centers around the idea of the steady state which in fact is the long-run equilibrium in growth theory.
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The Economics of Demographics
This one is a real treat for anyone simultaneoulsy interested in demographics and economics and as such also a treat for the DM team and hopefully for our faithful readers as well. What am I talking about then? In short, the IMF has chosen to devote their Septemper issue of Finance and Development to 'The Economics of Demographics' and obviously this cannot go un-noticed here. On that note we should thank fellow blogger Pienso for brining the IMF publication to our attention via E-Mail. So what do we have here?
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Immigration, Demographics, and Economics
Over the past few years, I have studied demographics and the economics of globalization and practiced to what extent I could through my jobs. What interests me most about the current state of demographic change throughout the world – is the fact that because of globalization, for the first time international migration has become a significant variable in how these changes translate into economic growth. To put it another way, the graying of parts of the world and population explosions in others can both be mitigated by net positive or net negative international migration, respectively.
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A Demographic Divide?
In the post below Edward discusses the demographics of Nigeria and more specifically how economic growth also is effected by high fertility parallel with the situation of economic growth and low fertility which is perhaps more widely cited here at Demography.Matters. As Edward notes in relation to Nigeria and more generally in the context of many sub-Saharan Africa high fertility is at the heart of the growth issue. The point here is in fact the savings rate and crucially what we could call a Malthusian trap where all the income is used for consumption and thus there is no room savings/investment dynamics (capital accumulation). Robert E. Lucas also explains this process in terms of the growth feedback with Malthusian population dynamics.
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Nigeria Population Census Results
Well I don't have a lot to say about the details of the findings at this point (since among other things Thomas may want to say something), but as he suggested in this post, the Nigerian census results are now complete and published:
Nigeria's population is growing at an annual rate of 3.2 percent and stands at just over 140 million, a 63 percent increase in 15 years, population commission chairman Samu'ila Mukama has said.
"The total number of the Nigerian population is 140,003,542," Mukama announced in presenting the provisional results of the March 2006 census to President Olusegun Obasanjo in the federal capital Abuja on Friday.
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Message To Central Bankers: Target Median Ages!
Central bankers are all in a flurry right now, since they don't seem to be any too sure what it is they should be targeting, inflation or monetary aggregates. Well I have one piece of advice for them: keep your eyes on both of these (provided that is you know how to interpret the signals) but add one more objective (or pillar) to your list - population median age.
Sounds daft, doesn't it? What a silly idea Edward!Well no actually, it isn't. And the fact that most people in the macroeconomic community haven't appreciated the role and importance of this metric is one of the principal reasons why many observers are at such a loss to understand what is happening in Germany and Japan right now, and why the proponents of the so-called 'Goldilocks' recovery are discovering that there just isn't enough honey in the pot to go round (obviously some of it was eaten by one of those bears I mentioned in the last post). For a brief introduction to the macroeconomics of this problem, see this post from Claus (and then drill as far down as you want, one thing is for sure, you won't reach Australia, since Australia isn't on the list of countries with a preoccupyingly high median age, at least not just yet it isn't, which is why over at the Australian central bank they may like to take note of what I am saying while there is still time).
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Immigration, Ageing Populations and Economic Growth
Marty Feldstein has an article in the Financial Times today under the header "Immigration is no way to fund an ageing population". This is a strange coincidence since earlier this week I was busy posting on Italian Economy Watch about the boost given to economic growth in Italy in recent years by the growing numbers of immigrants who have been arriving there.
Now since I am arguing that immigration is in fact a significant policy tool which can be leveraged to address the problems raised by population ageing, a clear clash of opinions would seem to exist. So who is right here?
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Desired Family Size
Ideal family Size
This is a sort of 'summary' post to introduce a fairly complex topic. Basically one part of the 'low fertility' debate centres around the idea that many women in the end have less children than they actually want. This argument is normally deployed to support the idea that developed societies are far nearer replacement fertility than they think, and that with the right kind of institutional support fertility can be teased (word used advisedly) back up again.
continue reading
This is a sort of 'summary' post to introduce a fairly complex topic. Basically one part of the 'low fertility' debate centres around the idea that many women in the end have less children than they actually want. This argument is normally deployed to support the idea that developed societies are far nearer replacement fertility than they think, and that with the right kind of institutional support fertility can be teased (word used advisedly) back up again.
continue reading
Germany
Migration and Germany
The German Federal Statistics Office has released the migration flow data for 2006:
As reported by the Federal Statistical Office on the basis of provisional results, 662,000 persons in-migrated to Germany in 2006 and 639,000 persons out-migrated. This results in net inward migration of 23,000 persons. That was 46,000 in-migrations less and 11,000 out-migrations more than in 2005. Consequently, net inward migration decreased strongly from the previous year (–71%), following a decrease by just 4% from 2004 to 2005.
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Auf Widersehen, Pet
This, as many readers may well know, used to be the title of a UK TV sit-com about British building workers seeking to improve their fortunes by working in Germany, but now the times, it seems, have changed.
In 2004 more than 150,000 Germans reported to their town halls that they were going abroad—the highest number since 1884. The real figure is almost certainly much higher. Germany, once the economic engine of Europe, is on the point of becoming a country of net emigration. The museum in Bremerhaven may soon need a new wing with an aeroplane cabin or high-speed railway carriage, today's mode of departure.
continue reading
"Two veteran film-makers confronted Germany's troubled health care and pension systems, throwing themselves into a sensitive debate which many political leaders have shied away from."
Now, not having seen the film in question it is hard to judge the quality of the treatment or the validity of the specific points they make, but the very existence of this contemporary confrontation of life and art, of politics and fiction, and the simple fact that the filmakers are raising the issues they are in the way that they do, while far too many "reality based" politicians are ducking them, seems interesting in and of itself to me:
continue reading
German demographics ... food for thought!
The FT had a really telling article about the demographics of Germany I couple of days I thought I would share with you. It is well known that Germany is getting older and that the country's TFR rate is well below replacement levels (1.3). This means that as we go along the relationship between old and young people (can also be operationalized as the dependancy ratio) will change markedly. For visuals of the general outlook of German demographics check out this figure (found under 'population development').
continue reading
Life Expectancy in East and West Germany
After so many days of posting topics related one way or another with death, perhaps it is better to get back to life. One good excuse for doing this could be the 25th International Population Conference organised by the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population and which opened yesterday in Tours, France.
You can find the full conference agenda here, and there are topics to suit all tastes for those who are interested.
continue reading
The nature of Germany's population as we move forward
It has been some time since anybody on the Demography.Matters team has put something up. I think we are busy at the moment doing other things because it most certainly is not lack of interest and spirit. (Upd. Incidentally Thomas has new post up just before this one) Well, apologies aside ... we are obviously bound to react when the NewEconomist duly prompts us back into action (literally:)) by pointing us to a recent report by Deutche Bank Research about Germany's demographic challenge (PDF-format).
continue reading
"Denn eines ist sicher: die Rente"
"One thing is certain: your (state) pension" Like all politicians, Norbert Blüm (the former German Minister of Labour and Social affairs 1982-1998) may not like to be reminded of earlier promises or campaign slogans. That job now falls on his successor Franz Müntefering who is in a hurry and now has to rapidly introduce pension reforms. Actions previously thought unthinkable or simply political suicide suddenly become very real indeed. Annual increases for retirees have been fixed at zero percent for 2004 and 2005. In 2006 they would have to be lowered because average German wages dropped (increases for retirees are tied to wages in Germany) but even Müntefering backed down from that option for the moment. Meanwhile the retirement age will be raised to 67 within 18 years instead of 24. and may even be raised to 68 for civil servants. An unpopular but financially sound move because it´s a win-win situation : people work longer and retire later, thereby reducing future claims. From 130% to 105% of GDP in fact. A welcome relief for a government that´s struggling to get its finances in order.
continue reading
Germany gives the family a try
In an effort to boost fertility Germany is taking another small step in 2007 by setting up a "familien politik". This time in the form of "elterngeld" whereby the parent (in Germany by tradition always the mother) who stays at home for the first 12 months receives a 67% compensation of their net income up to a certain maximum, plus if the father also pull his weight that period can be extended by 2 months to 14. Another step, but is it enough?
continue reading
No Answers Only Questions
One person who could rightly claim to know more about global ageing and its possible consequences than anyone else in the business is the German Director of the Manheim Research Institute for the Economics of Ageing Axel Börsch-Supan. If there’s a conference being organised, he seems to be there. Actually his comments at both these meet-ups are well worth reading in and of themselves (here, and here).
In a sense Börsch-Supan is almost uniquely qualified to express opinions on the topic since he has both devoted a large part of his professional career to studying the question, and he lives and works in a society which is already reeling under the impact. As he says:
continue reading
The German Federal Statistics Office has released the migration flow data for 2006:
As reported by the Federal Statistical Office on the basis of provisional results, 662,000 persons in-migrated to Germany in 2006 and 639,000 persons out-migrated. This results in net inward migration of 23,000 persons. That was 46,000 in-migrations less and 11,000 out-migrations more than in 2005. Consequently, net inward migration decreased strongly from the previous year (–71%), following a decrease by just 4% from 2004 to 2005.
continue reading
Auf Widersehen, Pet
This, as many readers may well know, used to be the title of a UK TV sit-com about British building workers seeking to improve their fortunes by working in Germany, but now the times, it seems, have changed.
In 2004 more than 150,000 Germans reported to their town halls that they were going abroad—the highest number since 1884. The real figure is almost certainly much higher. Germany, once the economic engine of Europe, is on the point of becoming a country of net emigration. The museum in Bremerhaven may soon need a new wing with an aeroplane cabin or high-speed railway carriage, today's mode of departure.
continue reading
Germany: Fiction vs Reality
The old adage that life is but a faint copy of art took a new twist in Germany this week as:"Two veteran film-makers confronted Germany's troubled health care and pension systems, throwing themselves into a sensitive debate which many political leaders have shied away from."
Now, not having seen the film in question it is hard to judge the quality of the treatment or the validity of the specific points they make, but the very existence of this contemporary confrontation of life and art, of politics and fiction, and the simple fact that the filmakers are raising the issues they are in the way that they do, while far too many "reality based" politicians are ducking them, seems interesting in and of itself to me:
continue reading
German demographics ... food for thought!
The FT had a really telling article about the demographics of Germany I couple of days I thought I would share with you. It is well known that Germany is getting older and that the country's TFR rate is well below replacement levels (1.3). This means that as we go along the relationship between old and young people (can also be operationalized as the dependancy ratio) will change markedly. For visuals of the general outlook of German demographics check out this figure (found under 'population development').
continue reading
Life Expectancy in East and West Germany
After so many days of posting topics related one way or another with death, perhaps it is better to get back to life. One good excuse for doing this could be the 25th International Population Conference organised by the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population and which opened yesterday in Tours, France.
You can find the full conference agenda here, and there are topics to suit all tastes for those who are interested.
continue reading
The nature of Germany's population as we move forward
It has been some time since anybody on the Demography.Matters team has put something up. I think we are busy at the moment doing other things because it most certainly is not lack of interest and spirit. (Upd. Incidentally Thomas has new post up just before this one) Well, apologies aside ... we are obviously bound to react when the NewEconomist duly prompts us back into action (literally:)) by pointing us to a recent report by Deutche Bank Research about Germany's demographic challenge (PDF-format).
continue reading
"Denn eines ist sicher: die Rente"
"One thing is certain: your (state) pension" Like all politicians, Norbert Blüm (the former German Minister of Labour and Social affairs 1982-1998) may not like to be reminded of earlier promises or campaign slogans. That job now falls on his successor Franz Müntefering who is in a hurry and now has to rapidly introduce pension reforms. Actions previously thought unthinkable or simply political suicide suddenly become very real indeed. Annual increases for retirees have been fixed at zero percent for 2004 and 2005. In 2006 they would have to be lowered because average German wages dropped (increases for retirees are tied to wages in Germany) but even Müntefering backed down from that option for the moment. Meanwhile the retirement age will be raised to 67 within 18 years instead of 24. and may even be raised to 68 for civil servants. An unpopular but financially sound move because it´s a win-win situation : people work longer and retire later, thereby reducing future claims. From 130% to 105% of GDP in fact. A welcome relief for a government that´s struggling to get its finances in order.
continue reading
Germany gives the family a try
In an effort to boost fertility Germany is taking another small step in 2007 by setting up a "familien politik". This time in the form of "elterngeld" whereby the parent (in Germany by tradition always the mother) who stays at home for the first 12 months receives a 67% compensation of their net income up to a certain maximum, plus if the father also pull his weight that period can be extended by 2 months to 14. Another step, but is it enough?
continue reading
No Answers Only Questions
One person who could rightly claim to know more about global ageing and its possible consequences than anyone else in the business is the German Director of the Manheim Research Institute for the Economics of Ageing Axel Börsch-Supan. If there’s a conference being organised, he seems to be there. Actually his comments at both these meet-ups are well worth reading in and of themselves (here, and here).
In a sense Börsch-Supan is almost uniquely qualified to express opinions on the topic since he has both devoted a large part of his professional career to studying the question, and he lives and works in a society which is already reeling under the impact. As he says:
continue reading
US Fertilily
Migration and Economic Growth in the US
One of our themes here at Demography Matters is the idea that inward migrant flows can help ease the pressure put on health and pension systems which results from excessively rapid population change. As I argue here, in the case of Ireland, this is a win-win situation, where a comparatively young population generates a level of economic growth which attracts an inflow of migrants which helps maintain the population as a comparatively young one. At the other end a rather older society like Italy attracts migrants at a somewhat slower pace and is unable to generate enough economic activity and growth to hold on to its own young educated people.
continue reading
US Fertilily
According to PRB.org's 2006 World Population Data Sheet Canada's population as of mid-2006 was 32.6 million while that of the USA was 299.1 million. The same document shows that the rate of natural increase in population for the two countries is 0.3 percent per year for Canada and 0.6 per year for the USA. So absent immigration the USA is expected to increase its population twice as fast as Canada on a percentage basis alone. When you take into account the base population number, we should expect to see Canada's population increase absent immigration by 97,800 persons whereas with the same criteria the US population should increase by 1,794,600 persons. A figure which is 18 times greater than the Canadian increase.
continue reading
US Demography: A Tale of Two Pyramids?
I've already made a number of attempts here to try and get a better understanding of the dynamics behind US demography. This was an early attempt, where I try and link the rebound in the TFR that can be seen from the mid 70s to the start of modern-era large-scale immigration together with the slowing down in the birth postponement process in the US 'majority' population and the consequent 'recovery' of missing births (this process has also been noted in a number of societies in North Western Europe). The rebound can be clearly seen in this graph:
continue reading
More On US Demographics
"Is American society really so resilient that nothing can shake its foundation?" asked Claus in the last post. Well the answer obviously is no, since no society is that resilient. But is the US pretty well insulated from the current round of demographic shocks? This might be a more interesting question. I think the answer would be probably "yes", at least up to 2020 (the same probably also goes for the UK and France which are going to encounter relatively benign ageing in the short term). As ageing expert Axel Borsch Supan never tires of saying, Germany is now where the US will only be 20 years from now.
continue reading
Impact of ageing in USA?
How will the world's largest economy be impacted by an ageing population. Well, it is an important question to which I do not know the full answer but lets give it a go anyways. A recent report from the US census bureau gives us all the relevant data and previsions; get the full report here (warning; huge PDF file - 254 pages)
continue reading
US Fertilty and Growth, A Research Agenda
Possibly some could accuse me - and probably with good reason - of being obsessed with the US fertility issue (see this post which was a first pass at the issue, and this one by Claus). I think what is happening on the fertility front in the US is important for all of us since the US fertility situation is more or less unique in the OECD world, and possibly will become even more unique as an increasing number of developing countries attain below replacement (and possibly even lowest-low) ferility. The examples of the Asian tigers, China, Thailand, the Southernmost (and economically most succesful) Indian States (Kerala, Tamil Nadu) should give us serious food for thought on this count.
continue reading
US Fertility I
This post needs to be read in association with the agenda outlined in my last post. Basically I have been arguing on this blog that the US derived Total fertility Rate is a composite statistic being derived from three separate fertility regimes. Commenter SM Sterling points out that, of course, any taxonomic system is to some extent arbitrary, and that you could multiply this number considerably, it is simply that I am not convinced what positive advantage would be achieved by doing so).
Conventionally, for example over at the Population Reference Bureau, these regimes are defined ethnically:
continue reading
US Fertility II: Teenage Births
One of the 'stylised facts' of the relatively high US fertility in OECD terms has been the level of adolescent pregnancy among some groups of the population. Well it is important to note that the importance of this component is decreasing. According to CDC produced Final Births Data for 2003 the teenage birth rate in the US fell 3 percent in 2003 to 41.6 births per 1,000 women aged 15–19 years. This in fact represented another record low for the US and the rate has now fallen by a full one-third since its 1991 peak of 61.8. The rate for females aged 10–14 years declined to 0.6 per 1,000, again a one-third decline since 2000. Birth rates for teenagers 15–17 and 18–19 years each fell 3 percent. The rate for ages 15–17 years was 22.4 per 1,000, 42 percent lower than in 1991, and the rate for ages 18–19 years was 70.7 per 1,000, 25 percent lower than in 1991.
continue reading
US Fertility II: Mother's Age At First Birth
Another 'stylised fact' of US fertility has been the comparatively low average first birth ages of US mothers when compared with, say, European ones. In part this has been a product of the comparatively high level of teenage pregnancy, but this is far from being the whole picture.
As can be seen from the above graph birth rates in the age bands 25-29, 30-34, 35-39 and 40 to 44 have all been rising steadily since the early 90s, while those in the 15-19 and the 25-29 groups have been falling. As noted in the last post, the decline in the 15-19 age band represents a sustained and ongoing reduction in the importance of teenage pregnancy.
continue reading
US: The Coming Demographic Tsunami
Well, reading through this account of a recent speech by David M. Walker, head of the US Government Accountability Office, I have only one thing to say: Demography Really Does Matter.
Walker has committed himself "to touring the nation through the 2008 elections, talking to anybody who will listen about the fiscal black hole Washington has dug itself, the "demographic tsunami" that will come when the baby boom generation begins retiring and the recklessness of borrowing money from foreign lenders to pay for the operation of the U.S. government".
continue reading
One of our themes here at Demography Matters is the idea that inward migrant flows can help ease the pressure put on health and pension systems which results from excessively rapid population change. As I argue here, in the case of Ireland, this is a win-win situation, where a comparatively young population generates a level of economic growth which attracts an inflow of migrants which helps maintain the population as a comparatively young one. At the other end a rather older society like Italy attracts migrants at a somewhat slower pace and is unable to generate enough economic activity and growth to hold on to its own young educated people.
continue reading
US Fertilily
According to PRB.org's 2006 World Population Data Sheet Canada's population as of mid-2006 was 32.6 million while that of the USA was 299.1 million. The same document shows that the rate of natural increase in population for the two countries is 0.3 percent per year for Canada and 0.6 per year for the USA. So absent immigration the USA is expected to increase its population twice as fast as Canada on a percentage basis alone. When you take into account the base population number, we should expect to see Canada's population increase absent immigration by 97,800 persons whereas with the same criteria the US population should increase by 1,794,600 persons. A figure which is 18 times greater than the Canadian increase.
continue reading
US Demography: A Tale of Two Pyramids?
I've already made a number of attempts here to try and get a better understanding of the dynamics behind US demography. This was an early attempt, where I try and link the rebound in the TFR that can be seen from the mid 70s to the start of modern-era large-scale immigration together with the slowing down in the birth postponement process in the US 'majority' population and the consequent 'recovery' of missing births (this process has also been noted in a number of societies in North Western Europe). The rebound can be clearly seen in this graph:
continue reading
More On US Demographics
"Is American society really so resilient that nothing can shake its foundation?" asked Claus in the last post. Well the answer obviously is no, since no society is that resilient. But is the US pretty well insulated from the current round of demographic shocks? This might be a more interesting question. I think the answer would be probably "yes", at least up to 2020 (the same probably also goes for the UK and France which are going to encounter relatively benign ageing in the short term). As ageing expert Axel Borsch Supan never tires of saying, Germany is now where the US will only be 20 years from now.
continue reading
Impact of ageing in USA?
How will the world's largest economy be impacted by an ageing population. Well, it is an important question to which I do not know the full answer but lets give it a go anyways. A recent report from the US census bureau gives us all the relevant data and previsions; get the full report here (warning; huge PDF file - 254 pages)
continue reading
US Fertilty and Growth, A Research Agenda
Possibly some could accuse me - and probably with good reason - of being obsessed with the US fertility issue (see this post which was a first pass at the issue, and this one by Claus). I think what is happening on the fertility front in the US is important for all of us since the US fertility situation is more or less unique in the OECD world, and possibly will become even more unique as an increasing number of developing countries attain below replacement (and possibly even lowest-low) ferility. The examples of the Asian tigers, China, Thailand, the Southernmost (and economically most succesful) Indian States (Kerala, Tamil Nadu) should give us serious food for thought on this count.
continue reading
US Fertility I
This post needs to be read in association with the agenda outlined in my last post. Basically I have been arguing on this blog that the US derived Total fertility Rate is a composite statistic being derived from three separate fertility regimes. Commenter SM Sterling points out that, of course, any taxonomic system is to some extent arbitrary, and that you could multiply this number considerably, it is simply that I am not convinced what positive advantage would be achieved by doing so).
Conventionally, for example over at the Population Reference Bureau, these regimes are defined ethnically:
continue reading
US Fertility II: Teenage Births
One of the 'stylised facts' of the relatively high US fertility in OECD terms has been the level of adolescent pregnancy among some groups of the population. Well it is important to note that the importance of this component is decreasing. According to CDC produced Final Births Data for 2003 the teenage birth rate in the US fell 3 percent in 2003 to 41.6 births per 1,000 women aged 15–19 years. This in fact represented another record low for the US and the rate has now fallen by a full one-third since its 1991 peak of 61.8. The rate for females aged 10–14 years declined to 0.6 per 1,000, again a one-third decline since 2000. Birth rates for teenagers 15–17 and 18–19 years each fell 3 percent. The rate for ages 15–17 years was 22.4 per 1,000, 42 percent lower than in 1991, and the rate for ages 18–19 years was 70.7 per 1,000, 25 percent lower than in 1991.
continue reading
US Fertility II: Mother's Age At First Birth
Another 'stylised fact' of US fertility has been the comparatively low average first birth ages of US mothers when compared with, say, European ones. In part this has been a product of the comparatively high level of teenage pregnancy, but this is far from being the whole picture.
As can be seen from the above graph birth rates in the age bands 25-29, 30-34, 35-39 and 40 to 44 have all been rising steadily since the early 90s, while those in the 15-19 and the 25-29 groups have been falling. As noted in the last post, the decline in the 15-19 age band represents a sustained and ongoing reduction in the importance of teenage pregnancy.
continue reading
US: The Coming Demographic Tsunami
Well, reading through this account of a recent speech by David M. Walker, head of the US Government Accountability Office, I have only one thing to say: Demography Really Does Matter.
Walker has committed himself "to touring the nation through the 2008 elections, talking to anybody who will listen about the fiscal black hole Washington has dug itself, the "demographic tsunami" that will come when the baby boom generation begins retiring and the recklessness of borrowing money from foreign lenders to pay for the operation of the U.S. government".
continue reading
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