US Fertility I

by Edward Hugh

This post needs to be read in association with the agenda outlined in my last post. Basically I have been arguing on this blog that the US derived Total fertility Rate is a composite statistic being derived from three separate fertility regimes. Commenter SM Sterling points out that, of course, any taxonomic system is to some extent arbitrary, and that you could multiply this number considerably, it is simply that I am not convinced what positive advantage would be achieved by doing so).

Conventionally, for example over at the Population Reference Bureau, these regimes are defined ethnically:

One explanation for the higher U.S. fertility is that many European countries have racially homogeneous populations compared with the United States. In the United States, fertility rates differ among the nation's varied racial and ethnic population groups. In 1998, the U.S. TFR of 2.1 children per woman was made up of several different rates: non-Hispanic white, 1.8; black, 2.2; American Indian, 2.1; Asian and Pacific Islander, 1.9; and Hispanic, 2.9.

This is certainly part of the picture, and the united states is certainly more diverse than many EU societies. But is it as simple as this. I tried to have a first shot at this problem in this post. Basically I think, as I argue that that the impact of the most recent wave of immigration on current US fertility has been huge, but immigration is not the only pertinent factor here.

Basically, as I say there are three regimes:

1) A regime which follows the 'European Pattern' of steadily rising educational levels, increasing life expectancy and declining fertility. I say 'European Pattern' since of course this trend is being follwed increasingly in Asia, and, as many have noted, in Western Turkey and Iran (to name but some). There is nothing especially 'ethnic' about all this, it is simply a product of one path of economic development.

2) A regime which is based on high rates of school dropout, unstable partnerships, and frequent adolencent pregnancy. Since this regime, in one form or another, can be found in the UK and Ireland it has been called an 'anglo' regime, but, of course the Irish are Celts, so again ethnic labelling fails us. The parts of the Afro American population also appear to follow this profile.

3) The hispanic regime. This is a relatively high-fertility regime (around 2.8 TFR and falling), but appears to combine many of the features of relatively higher fertility to be found in traditional societies with some of the teenage pregnancy, school dropout unstable partnership patterns which characterise the second regime. As such the rate of fertility decline to be expected here is hard to foresee.

Fertility readings for the first group may be deceptive, becuase almost certainly widespread birth postponenment has been taking place over recent decades in this group, and this, as we know, produces early statistical declines in the TFRs which later reverse as the 'missing births' occur at the higher ages. What will be very interesting will be to follow the final parities for subsequent cohorts in this group.

Also to be watched is the evolution of the third regime. It is typically a 'third world' regime, and as such may be subject to rapid downward movements in TFRs, movements which can be produced by substantial upward movements in first birth ages, just as we can see in Southern Europe or in the Asian Tigers.

Reference

On the first regime, this paper by this intriguing paper by US researchers Robert Drago & Amy Varner “Fertility and Work in the United States: A Policy Perspective” is a useful background to the pre-latest wave immigration evolution of US fertility.