Thursday, May 31, 2007

Catching Up?

One of the most fundamental assumptions on economic growth in the long-run is idea of convergence or catch-up growth. This is a process by which developing economies countries grow faster than their developed counterparts. The nature of this convergence process which should be seen in the context of neo-classical economics (new growth theory) depends on the overall assumptions of scale economies built into the models. This entry will not go into this in much detail but rather home-in on the case of the Eastern European transition economies, often also referred to as the lynx economies alluding to their comparison with the Asian tigers.

The main point of departure is the May monthly bulletin from the European Central Bank (ECB) which includes an article on the determinants of growth in Central and Eastern Europe. In many ways the analysis is a plain vanilla application of the Neo-classical growth model with the inbuilt assumption that institutions matter and as such that growth perhaps should be seen as endogenous instead of exogenous as it was originally proposed by Solow. However, the authors' main thrust raises some very interesting points. Apart from the standard (and also important mind you) recommendations to ensure credible fiscal and monetary policy, increased spending on R&D, elimination of red tape to improve the attractiveness of the business environment the authors also note the crucial importance of investing in human capital as well as the need to address the structural labour market mismatch.

Now all of this in the East European context needs to be understood in the light of two mechanisms which are currently at work. One of these is the catch-up process itself, and this process entails a steady move up the value chain and of course if the country's human capital endowment does not move to match this development it will create bottlenecks. However, a more crucial point is this ...

The existing skill mismatches may be affected by the increased migration of labour from the CEE countries to some of the other EU countries following the opening of their labour markets. Given that young and qualified workers typically show the highest propensity to migrate, increased east-west migration within the EU, while generally beneficial and desirable in economic terms, may temporarily aggravate existing labour market bottlenecks in some sectors in the CEE countries. At the same time, the skills that these workers acquire abroad may support productivity growth in the long run, provided that the large share of current migration is temporary in character.

The first thing to notice is that this impact of migration flows and their subsequent affect on the labour market, and indeed abililty to move swiftly up the value chain, was exactly the critique I levied recently towards the large World Bank report on migration in Eastern Europe, the CIS, and Asia. Secondly there is of course the last part of the extract which talks about how net emigration in the long run might support productivity growth as the skilled labour returns to their home country to offer their highly productive labour. This is a bold assumption and far from certain I think. More generally, and despite the authors' ardent efforts, they are, I think, bumping against the frontier in terms of the explanatory power of neo-classical growth theory here. As such, the suggested remedies of increasing labour market reforms and investment in human capital seem to me to be missing the main point at issue. In short, we are dealing with countries where the demographic transition by far, and indeed worryingly, has outpaced the traditional economic process of economic convergence.

At some point these two processes will intersect (they are perhaps doing so already?) and the reality will be that these countries will have serious problems in nudging up the value chain. An interesting data point here is that the labour market for the tertiary (i.e. services/high value added) sector is already extremely tight in the all of Eastern and Central Europe. The average unemployment rate in these sectors is at a staggering 3.27% - with lows in Lithuania, the Czech Republic, and Latvia at 2.4%, 2.5% and 2.6% respectively. Combined with very high unemployment levels in the primary sector this does of course suggest that there is plenty of room for targeted investment to exert a pressure which transfers general capacity up through the value chain, but with the sustained process of ageing which these countries face (and the difficulties that this poses in terms of altering their skill profile) this looks as very difficult task indeed.

Regarding the low unemployment rate in the tertiary sector, conventional wisdom would of course envision that this would keep those engineer graduates at home or perhaps persuade those who have left to come back. Yet, what if the extremely low unemployment rates is a function of something else and more structural? What if in fact the low unemployment rates is a reflection for a general scarcity of highly skilled labour? This would then suggest a more structural capacity issue rather than the traditional notion of a labour market mismatch. In this case it is of course not exclusively one or the other but since the structural capacity issue is only very rarely mentioned I think it is important to emphasize this, and especially in connection with the trend of net-emigration of skilled labour. A concrete example of this capacity constraint and labour market mismatch can be found in Poland as I noted over at Alpha.Sources some time ago:

(from the FT)
Poland’s rapid leap in productivity is taking place in spite of the drag caused by the 20 per cent of the Polish workforce that is employed in agriculture – producing only 3 per cent of GDP. The country also has the highest level of unemployment in the European Union, at 17.8 per cent, and the lowest level of labour participation in the OECD, the world’s most industrialised countries.

Many of those out of work are unemployable in a modern economy and some Polish companies are experiencing difficulty in finding qualified workers. A recent study by Poland’s central bank found that 42 per cent of firms had trouble finding qualified workers.


The reason why many of these unemployed workers might be considered "unemployable in a modern economy" is of course their comparatively low level of education and their comparatively old age, and it is the combination of these two which presents the problem.

This effect is of coursed primarily and in the short run driven by sectoral labour market mismatches but more structurally it is exacerbated by outward migration and a structural decline in the labour force as a result of ageing. And despite the increasingly tighter labour markets it is exactly this potential vicious circle which should lead us to be rather cautious about assuming a great reversal in migration flows.

In Summary


So, there you have it; another dose of demographic fundamentalism. Well, after all this is the 'demography.matters' blog so it should not come as much of a surprise. Having said that I am not fundamentally at odds with the traditional economic analysis fielded in the ECB article noted above. Without a doubt there is much pertinence in their general analysis. However, I do think that it fails to adequately factor-in the demographic component of long term growth and in this case the ability of these economies to sustain the convergence process by continuously moving up the value chain. However it should be noted that all the signs still point to a continuation in the convergence process, at least for now. Consequently, if you look at growth rates in, for example, the Baltic countries these are still very healthy. The question really, of course, is just how long this can be sustained and whether in fact these economies can decidedly shift their economic activities in the effort towards a long run steady state (or process of continuous endogenously driven growth)?

Post scriptum ...

In terms of general sources on this topic I recommend the following ...

This publication from the UN (PDF!) which describes the process of very rapid fertility decline in the Eastern and Central European transition countries from 1982-1997.

This publication from the European Bank of Reconstructuring and Development (PDF!) which attempts to give an overview of the impact from ageing on pension systems and public finances in the transition countries.

And finally I can hardly take on this subject without also noting Edward Lucas who is the Eastern and Central European correspondent for the Economist. Over at his blog, he posts relentlessly on the region's economy, politics, and society. As a one stop source for information on the topic at hand you would be hard pressed to find anything more informative than Edward Lucas' writings.

Migration and Germany

The German Federal Statistics Office has released the migration flow data for 2006:

As reported by the Federal Statistical Office on the basis of provisional results, 662,000 persons in-migrated to Germany in 2006 and 639,000 persons out-migrated. This results in net inward migration of 23,000 persons. That was 46,000 in-migrations less and 11,000 out-migrations more than in 2005. Consequently, net inward migration decreased strongly from the previous year (–71%), following a decrease by just 4% from 2004 to 2005.

So there is a net inward balance of migrants in 2006 of 23,000. In view of the significant ageing process which is taking place in Germany this is indeed preoccupying. We have commented on this situation on DM a number of times (and here). In today's Financial Times there is some evidence of the impact the lack of substantial inward migration is having on some sectors of the German economy:


Germany’s decision to restrict the working rights of east Europeans is hitting consumers where it hurts – their asparagus steamers.

After this year’s warm, wet spring, the sandy plains of central Germany should have yielded an asparagus vintage for the history books. Instead, entire fields of the delicacy are rotting unplucked. Farmers, politicians and economists are scrambling for an explanation.

At the Federal Statistical Office, which charts the amount produced in the country, experts are warning about a paradoxical year, with a harvest below the record 82,000 tons registered in 2005 despite better growing conditions.

Everyone agrees on the reason; there is a shortage of pickers. The 300,000 foreign seasonal hands, mainly Poles, who normally work the three-month “Spargelsaison” seem to have better things to do this year.

Jürgen Jakobs, who runs a farm in Beelitz, the Vatican of asparagus culture, says only two-thirds of the 300 Poles he wanted to hire this year bothered to respond, forcing him to leave 15 per cent of his land unharvested. These fields are now covered in two-metre high, inedible green ferns.

For free-market liberals, the blame lies with government. Last year Berlin was one of six older members of the European Union to extend restrictions on citizens from new member states working in the country......

Herbert Buscher, economist at the IWH research institute in Halle, agrees that Germany, whose booming economy is now suffering from drastic shortages of workers in certain sectors, has “shot itself in the foot with its restriction to the free movement of workers”.


I would emphasise at this point that there are three things to think about here.

a) the German labour market is obviously suffering a net human capital loss (just like Italy) since those leaving are better educated than those arriving. This will have an impact on productivity growth (and TFP) in the future.

b) Germany will undoubtedly have to change course on migration since they have basic needs in areas like agriculture and care of the elderly that they simply cannot meet domestically. These are also two areas which have been important in Spain. Almost no Spanish nationals are new entrants into the unskilled end of these sectors.

c) the fact that Germany is not able to generate a SUSTAINED construction boom means that it will not get - whatever the changes in policy - the volume of migration necessary to generate the feedback mechanisms we see at work in Ireland, the US, the UK, Greece, Spain etc, and thus and thus the new migration they may get will not materially affect the population ageing process in Germany, or produce the much needed revival in internal consumption.

For some economic explanation for the assertion made in (c) see this recent post on Ireland and this one on migrant flows into the US.

My guess is that all those societies who have inadvertently let their median age rise significantly over the 40 watermark are going to be faced with significant issues in this regard.


Update

This human capital impact of Germany's outflow is one topic which seems to be gaining traction. I am updating with some extracts from this to the point piece in the Independent yesterday:

German brain drain at highest level since 1940s



Leading economists and employers say the trend is alarming. They note that many among Germany's new breed of home-grown "guest workers" are highly-educated management consultants, doctors, dentists, scientists and lawyers.

OECD figures show that Germany is near the top of a league of industrial nations experiencing a brain drain which for the first time since the 1950s now exceeds the number of immigrants.

Stephanie Wahl, of the Institute for Economics, based in Bonn, said that those who are leaving Germany are mostly highly motivated and well educated. "Those coming in are mostly poor, untrained and hardly educated," she added.

Fed up with comparatively poor job prospects at home - where unemployment is as high as 17 per cent in some regions - as well as high taxes and bureaucracy, thousands of Germans have upped sticks for Austria and Switzerland, or emigrated to the United States.

Yesterday, the country'swoes were underscored by a report which disclosed that areas of unemployment-wracked eastern Germany were populated by a "male-dominated underclass susceptible to far right ideology" because of a dramatic 25 per cent exodus of young women aged 18 to 29.

More than 18,000 Germans moved to Switzerland last year. The US was the second most popular destination with 13,245, followed by Austria with 9,309.

Switzerland already has a resident German population of 170,000. Its presence has even provoked a xenophobic backlash in the country's tabloid press. Earlier this year, the Swiss newspaper Blick ran an anti-German campaign which spoke of a "German invasion" and quoted readers who claimed they found the German immigrants to be "arrogant and rude". Many immigrants, however, say the benefits of lower taxes and pay up to three times higher than at home far outweigh the occasional xenophobic outburst.

Claus Boche, a 32-year-old executive, left the west German city of Paderborn two-and-a-half years agoto take up a job with a Swiss management consulting firm. He now lives in Zurich. "Nearly everything is less bureaucratic and more go ahead than in Germany," he said. "I also pay about 40 per cent less tax. I have no plans to go back."

The current exodus hardly fits in with the official view of the German economy, which is said to be "booming". Although jobless figures for May were reported to be marginally up yesterday, Chancellor Angela Merkel's grand coalition government of conservatives and Social Democrats has taken credit for a steady 13-month decline in the country's unemployment to below four million.

However, the gradual economic upturn has so far failed to halt an exodus of the country's well-trained. Thomas Bauer, a labour economist from Essen, was scathing about Germany's employment conditions. "Germany is certainly not attractive when compared to other countries in Europe," he said. "The taxes are too high, the wages are too low and feelings of jealousy towards high-income earners is widespread. This is a special deterrent to the highly qualified."

Monday, May 28, 2007

Childbearing in Europe

As I mentioned in this post, the Population Association of America annual meeting 2007 played host to quite a large number of very useful and enlightening papers. From time to time I will try to highlight some of the more interesting ones among them here on Demography Matters.

In this vein, I would like to touch in this post on some of the questions raised in the paper Childbearing Trends and Policies in Europe: Is a new Demographic Disequilibrium Emerging? presented by Tomas Frejka, Jan Hoem, Tomáš Sobotka and Laurent Toulemon.

As the authors explain the paper is in the form of a report on "work in progress" and presents selected findings and conclusions from an international comparative research project which started in October 2005 - sponsored by the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research - and involves the study of 18 countries: Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Ukraine. As such the findings of the research - which will be finally presented in book form - represent an important source of data and analysis.

Now the authors define their project in the following rather radical terms:

In 1933 Landry concluded in his theory of the la révolution démographique that in a third pattern “there is no longer an equilibrium.” In 2001 Chesnais reminded us that Landry “envisaged a scenario of ‘permanent disequilibrium’ ”… and stated that “(T)here are strong arguments in favor of the eventual globalization of the birth deficit” … in which “(T)he long-term downward trend seems irreversible.” In 2003 Van de Kaa reflected that “(P)erhaps it is now time for someone to start thinking about writing a … volume entitled: ‘The Postmodern Decline of Population’. For Europe’s demographic future appears to be a thing of the past.” This volume is the initial attempt to write such a book. It is an assessment of whether humanity is facing a new demographic disequilibrium.

Now talk of an "irreversible" demographic disequilibrium may seem like strong language, but a long hard look at the available evidence may make the use of such terminology not so extreme as it seems at first sight. In most advanced countries fertility has long dropped below replacement rate, and in many cases well below this level, and trends in the developing world now give clear signs that this pattern may well continue to repeat itself. Obviously the idea of a planet with a somewhat smaller population level is not necessarily a bad thing in and of itself, but this idea of "disequilibrium" is perhaps rather more disturbing, since it does raise the question of just how, and when, the present trend may be reversed.


Turning to the European context, as the paper states:

a) With the possible exception of Albania there was not a single European country in 2004 with fertility at or above the replacement level (Council of Europe 2006).

b) As of 2004, 17 out of 38 European countries with over 100,000 inhabitants, 45 percent, had negative rates of population growth. This is a very recent phenomenon. In 1990 there were only three such countries. In some countries the negative rate of natural increase is offset by immigration. Nevertheless, 14 of the 38 countries had negative rates of population growth.

c) In 2002, 16 out of 39 European countries recorded period total fertility rates (TFR) below 1.3 and 25 countries recorded period TFRs below 1.5. The ‘lowest-low’ fertility spread throughout Europe affecting countries with more than one half of the European population by 2002, up from nil in the early 1990s. This proportion subsequently declined as the TFR in several large countries reverted above the threshold of 1.3. The spread of such low period TFR levels has been closely linked to the postponement of childbearing taking place in all regions of Europe. Almost three quarters of Europeans currently live in societies with the TFR below 1.5.


The key point to grasp is perhaps that the principle driver of the lowest-low reading which is being registered on the TFRs has been the phenomenon known as birth postponement. This impact is a result of the fact that during a long period of time - as average first birth ages move steadily upwards - comparatively few children are actually born, and this gives rise to a rather distorted TFR reading, since as some of the women who have remained childless during their 20s move up the age ranges they may (and do) start to have children - the so-called recovered births - and hence a certain recovery in final fertility rates, or completed cohort fertility rates, may occur. (The reasoning which lies behind such thinking is explained further in this post here)

Now there is one proviso to be made at this point, and that is, as Claus and I have been recently explaining (and here)the real possibility exists that some of these countries with lowest-low fertility are caught in some kind of low fertility trap. This may not be a permanent trap, but it is a process which could last for several decades or even generations, and if this were to prove to be the case the issue would be a fairly serious one since the long term structural impact on national demography (and probably economic growth and living standards) would be important. So even if the "recovered births" may finally make their presence felt, if this were only to happen in several decades time, the population structure (and of course the reproductive generational base) would be seriously affected, and with long lasting consequences. As they say, demographic processes tend to cast a long shadow.

Now it is also important to bear in mind that there is below replacement fertility and "well-below" replacement fertility, so while it may be thoroughly unrealistic to think in terms of a large scale and generalized return to the magic number of 2.1TFR, fertility in the 1.7 -1.9 TFR range might be a much more manageable affair for our societies than ongoing fertility in the 1.3 - 1.5 TFR range. As the authors of the paper note:

There is a general consensus among scholars that “maintaining fertility at a level that does not fall much below a two-child average – say, around 1.7 – 1.8” (Demeny and McNicoll 2006:281) could be sustainable for a prolonged period.


So the tricky question is, just how can we nudge fertility up in those societies who might be deemed to be stuck in or around the lowest-low range?

Just how extended this lowest-low fertility issue is in Europe right now (although the problem is by no means a European one, since several Asian countries - including possibly China - may well already be affected) can be seen from the following charts presented in the paper (incidentally for a better view of the charts simply click over them).


Chart 1: Number of European countries with the period TFR below 1.7, 1.5 and 1.3
(out
of 39 countries with population above 100,000 in 2006)



Chart 2: Proportion of Europeans living in countries with the period TFR below 1.7, 1.5 and 1.3




Now as we are noting, the core of the problem seems often to be associated with a strong postponement process and a very rapid rise in mean ages at first childbirth. The next two charts should make this clearer in a European setting.

Chart 3: Mean age of women at first childbirth in selected countries and regions of
Europe, 1960-2004
(arithmetic averages)



Chart 4: Proportion of childbearing realized by women below age 25 in selected countries and regions of Europe, 1960-2004 (arithmetic averages)




Now the core of the "recovered births" argument focuses on the idea that the artificially low reading being registered on the period fertility TFRs is masking a much healthier situation in terms of the longer run cohort fertility rates. However, if we look at the long run trends in CFRs (see charts below) we will see that matters are not quite this simple.


Chart 5 - Total cohort fertility rates, selected WestEuropean countries, birth cohorts 1915-1970





Chart 6 - Total cohort fertility rates, selected Central and East European countries, birth cohorts 1924-1973



In fact what we can see, is that in general terms long run European CFRs are in continuing decline, and the only clear examples of a change of course come from societies - like Sweden and France - with a long tradition of systematic (and relatively expensive) pro-natalist policy. As the authors note:

"Even though it is not known to what degree childbearing will be recuperated, it can be surmised but not proven conclusively that quantum declines are a part of the trends of fertility behaviour of women in the midst of their childbearing in a number, possibly a majority, of European countries."

And here perhaps precisely we hit the problem: it can be surmised but not proven conclusively. And in this gap between what is surmised and what is proven lies a space which allows public policy - at least in an EU context - to languish in neglect, since after all, if it isn't conclusively proved, what is the justification for priority action.

Well, I come back to the quote I offered at the start of this post, European populations in many cases are in "demographic disequilibrium". At this point it is not clear whether or not this process is "reversible", but - and especially given the fact that, as Claus and I keep arguing, some of the economic consequences of this disequilibrium are already being noted at the level of economic processes and imbalances - doesn't it seem rather foolhardy to wait until we know for sure (and especially if in the end, by the time we are able to decide, they should prove to be non-reversible) before we really "take the bull by the horns". Put another way, is it not now time to act, and decisively?