Friday, April 13, 2007

Evolution of Fertility in the OECD 1970-2004

As Edward noted just below we have been taking a long break here at DM as of late. However, we have not been sitting idle and in this entry I would like to present the stylized facts of fertility trends in the OECD. Essentially, this entry is a re-post of an entry over at Alpha.Sources which is also, as it were, very relevant to DM. The data are taken from the recent 2007 OECD Factbook and more specifically this raw OECD excel data sheet. I realize that the tables are a bit messy in terms of distinguishing between the countries but I hope it is useful anyway. You can always consult this excel file which contains the graphs in plain design as well as graphs for individual countries.

The review begins with the overall evolution of fertility in the OECD; enjoy!

You do not get a much better picture of the demographic transition in the developed world than this I imagine but as we shall see there are notable differences between countries and regions which of course make the macroeconomic analysis and conceptualization more difficult. Nobody of course knows how far fertility can and will drift down but there does seem to be some kind of stabilization at 1.6 children per woman aged 15-49 in the aggregate OECD figure from 2000 and onwards. Note of course also that this figure does not take into account the different sizes of the countries and thus different contribution to the average population level in the OECD.

Moving back to the TFR rates however there are as mentioned differences and they are very important to pay attention to. Let us first look at the Anglo-Saxon (English speaking) countries which are doing a good job keeping the OECD aggregate TFR level afloat.

Here of course the TFR rate in the US just about at replacement levels should be noted. The convergence process from the 1970s and onwards is also interesting to note and especially that this convergence process coincides with notable divergence at the end point. Lastly, the convergence process itself shows that countries move through the demographic transition in quite different tempi and also as noted with different end points. Next, let us have a look at continental Europe where the overall convergence process is even less marked and thus also hides important divergences; note for example the difference between France and Germany. France, Belgium and the Netherlands are all above the 1.5 level with France close to 2.0. Conversely, Germany, Austria and Switzerland have converged close to the dreaded level of 1.3 which signifies lowest-low fertility (i.e. the fertility trap).

Moving on to southern Europe we see a distinct process of convergence towards lowest-low fertility. In terms of macroeconomic fundamentals immigration is very important to take into account here especially in Spain where the pickup in fertility rates from 1998 and onwards perhaps can be attributed to a positive fertility component from immigration. However overall, the fertility situation looks fairly dire in the southern parts of Europe.

And while we are in Europe why don't we take a look at Eastern Europe. The picture is of course incomplete but given the general level of development and their place in the global value chain the general fertility levels in this region should be the cause of much worry amongst the policymakers. It is thus most worrying to see these countries move through the demographic transition at a pace which is clearly not in sync with the pace of economic development.

On the second last graph we have the Nordic countries where fertility levels are generally higher than in the rest of Europe and close to replacement leves albeit somewhat (1.7+) lower for all countries except Iceland. Perhaps most interestingly the evolution in fertility is considerably more volatile than in other OECD countries. Note for example Denmark's pick-up from 1980s to the current level of TFR at about 1.8 and also Sweden has seen a pick-up from 1998.

Lastly, I am featuring a graph of a comparison I have often made between the three oldest countries in the world (measured by median age), Germany, Italy and Japan. As we can see from the graph all three countries are firmly set with fertility levels below 1.5 and close to lowest low fertility of 1.3.

Summary

Fertility levels can tell us a lot but by no means everything. Especially, the net migration rate is an important input to the full comprehension of the overall population dynamics in the individual countries. Moreover, the way fertility is treated above also does not take into account to cohort perspective. As such, it is important task to divide the fertility levels into more specific periods to really get a full picture. For example the periods 1970-80, 1980-1990, and 1990-2004 reveal notable differences in average fertility levels and as such y-o-y fluctuations in fertility rates are not very useful in themselves. I have begun the calculations on these periods in the .excel document linked to above. In the end however I hope that you have found this useful anyways and pleaes do feel free to use the data and graphs fore further study. More specifically I recommend you to download the .excel file and have a look at the data set. You never know when a paper comes along which demands the use of one of the fertility tables above. Of course you will also be able to customize the table design as you see fit from within the .excel file linked above.

PAA 2007

Looking at the date stamp on the last post I see it has now been two months since we put anything up on this blog. So, gentle reader, I would just like to take this opportunity to reassure you that we have no intention of closing shop. We have just been busy elsewhere, or giving some priority to our lives over our blogs. Or something like that.

Not that Demography Matters is exactly a news blog. Demographic processes, like climatic ones, don't, after all, exhibit dramatic changes from one day to the next, and much of the material contained in earlier posts is still extremely valid, and will continue to remain so for some time to come. But even if the processes themselves aren't subject to especially dramatic changes, our understanding and interpretation of them does evolve, and on a continuing basis.

The latest and best example of this is perhaps to be found in the collection of papers offered at this year's meeting of the Population Association of America, held in New York at the end of March.

There were many sesssions of direct interest for the objectives of this blog (with either complete papers or extended abstracts available online for many of the presentations). In particular perhaps I would single out:

Low Fertility in Comparative Perspective

Fertility Timing: Sociodemographic Consequences


Demographic Billionaires: India and China Compared


Timing of Childbearing

New Perspectives on Low Fertility

Perspectives on the Demographic Dividend

Obviously there is a lot of material here, and this is only a small part of what is available. I will try over the coming days and weeks to single out a few of the papers for more detailed comment.

Sunday, February 04, 2007

Demographics and an Overheated India?

Note: Parts of this post are re-produced from my own post on this subject over at Alpha.Sources.

There has certainly been much debate and discussion lately about what has been known as India's sizzling growth rates whether this rampant pace of the Indian economy is sustainable or whether in fact the economy was on its way to overheat and perhaps even collaps. More interestingly, this discussion has pitted our very Edward and his Indian colleagues over at the Indian Economy Blog against no other than the hegemoneous English magazine the Economist. As such, if you have been following the readings in the Economist as of late the journal has on several occasions pointed to the worrying signs of India's economic growth. A week ago the Economics Focus column featured two studies which compared economic growth in India and China; both of them by Barry Bosworth and Susan M. Collins from the Brookings Institution; 1) Accounting for Growth: Comparing India and China and 2) Sources of Growth in the Indian Economy. And the conclusion as quoted from the Economist Economics Focus column.

INDIA has been swept by optimism that its economy can do as well as China's. A recent article in the Economic Times claimed that the growth in India's total factor productivity (TFP), the efficiency with which inputs of both labour and capital are used, had accelerated, whereas China's had slowed owing to wasteful investment. As a result, the article boasted, rising productivity—the main driver of long-run economic growth—is now running neck and neck in the two economies. Close inspection of the numbers, however, reveals that China remains well ahead.

And now, in this weeks edition of the Economist the magazine punches through as the same story has found its way to the cover of the magazine in form of a leader and a special report. I won't go much into the refutation of the Economist's articles as such. To that end Nanubhai over at IEB already has an excellent critique up. However, the Economist also specifically notes the concept of the demographic dividend and more specifically how attributing importance to the role of demographics constitutes a mechanic view on economic growth. The two key quotes are pasted below:

From the leader ...

India's demographic structure is indeed starting to look more like that in East Asia when its growth took off. But this mechanistic view of growth assumes that demography is destiny and that economic policies do not matter. In fact, open markets, education and investment, especially in infrastructure, were the three chief ingredients of East Asia's success. Population growth by itself does not add to prosperity, unless young people are educated and new jobs are created. India needs to reform its absurdly restrictive labour laws which hold back the expansion of manufacturing particularly.

and from the special report ...

The growth optimists point to India's favourable demography. The population of working age will continue to rise for several decades, whereas in China it is expected to fall. This, it is argued, will boost India's workforce and both saving and investment. Furthermore, 60% of India's labour force is engaged in low productivity farming. As workers shift from agriculture to more productive jobs in industry and services, this will automatically boost GDP growth. Yet this assumes the newcomers will all find jobs. If those jobs do not appear, the so-called demographic dividend will more likely turn into a demographic disaster. Some 60% of the demographic bulge will come in five poor and badly governed states.

This is just one example of how economic commentators tend to confuse India's long-term potential (what is feasible provided the best policies are put in place) with its current potential (ie, non inflationary) growth rate. That India has huge long-term potential is undeniable, but without reforms the country cannot fully exploit it.

I clearly disagree with the Economist here and mostly this is because I feel like the magazine is picking on a strawman of our arguments at this site. So have we who believe in the importance of demographics misunderstood the situation here? The first important point I think is that the Economist indeed is right to point to the necessity for the right policies and political development to unlock India's long term potential. In fact, this is perhaps the most important point here and as such favorable demographics need to go hand in hand with sound policies especially in India where the risk of mounting regional inequality poses hazards for political stability and thus economic development. I don't think any of us has ever argued otherwise. However, now that we are talking about long term potential as oppose to trend growth it should be clear that these two cannot be totally detached and the reason is exactly the point The Economist itself implicitly refers to, namely the path dependancy of how demographics affect the long term growth potential. This is also why it is important to realize that demographics' effect on economic growth far from constitutes a mechanic view on economic growth. However, it is important I believe to the stress that the real source of India's long term potential first and foremost lies in the fact that the country now is passing through its DD and as such now has the potential to set in place policies which can ensure the apt exploitation of the economy's long term growth potential. Policies or perhaps more preciesly I think institutions do indeed matter for long term economic growth. The important point is though to realize that the population structure changes and as such the DD becomes a window of opportunity to lock in the highest possible sustainable growth trajectory for India going forward. So in the end, I have one main point here.

I do not agree with the Economist that attributing a weight to demographics in long term growth comprises a mechanic view of economic growth. Far from it and in fact the neo-classical steady state assumption which is essentially neutral to the structural economic changes which occur as a result of demographics is much more mechanic in my view since this theory clearly is out of tune in terms of how demographics affect economics. However, I am not accusing the Economist for naive steady statism here and as such the view on economic growth fielded in the Economist relates much closer to the idea of endogenous growth which contrary to neo-classical (exogenous growth) emphasizes the endogenous nature of economic growth as a function of the importance of policies for long term growth. However, where does this leave demographics then? Surely, the original neo-classical assumption of a fixed rate of population increase as a positive contribution to the slope of the steady state curve clearly, I believe, misses the big picture in terms of how economic growth is affected as a country passes through the demographic transition which (and please pay attention here) does not end with fertility rates stabilizing at replacement levels and thus a natural increase in the population. As such the crucial process of ageing which is occuring with different pace all over the world cannot be fed into the traditional long term growth model. But what about endogenous growth then? How should this view on growth tackle demographics? Surely demographics still constitute an exogenous shock to the economy? Well, this is exactly the point, does it really? I won't go into detail with my views here since I fear it would be too long and twisty but just to say that this issue is in part what we are discussing in terms of India. In fact, the transmission mechanism and indeed feedback loop between enacted policies and how demographics positively or negatively impact the economy in the long run constitute some of the most important areas of economic research focus in these years since ageing is well upon us and ultimately since I sincerely believe that we need to understand this much better in order to be able to connect the dots and thus make the right decision.

Demographics are not destiny but damn important and reducing the view that demographics actually matter for economic growth to a mechanic view on the topic is a critical blow which misses the importants points I think.