by Edward Hugh
I found this article in this morning's FT about Atlanta's plans to respond to the coming retirement of the baby-boomers interesting. Demographic issues in the United States have a much milder edge to those which are in evidence in many other parts of the globe, so it is revealing of something to see just how aware they are about the existence of the problem:
Atlanta leads fight to lure young and restless
A study published on Monday by the Metro Atlanta Chamber of Commerce showed that the city increased its share of the group – defined as university graduates aged 25-34 – faster than any other of the 50 largest metropolitan areas during the 1990s.
The study, conducted by a demographic research firm, was commissioned as part of efforts by Atlanta’s business community and civic leadership to develop a strategy for attracting young talent.
Sam Williams, president of the chamber, launched the initiative after noticing how availability of educated labour was becoming a bigger concern for businesses.
He recalls one company that was considering an investment in Atlanta asking: “We need 300 people with master’s degrees within three months. Are they there?”
Competition for talent is becoming increasingly fierce throughout the developed world as “baby-boomers” retire and birth rates decline. For decades, growth in higher education and increased labour participation by women provided rich seams of fresh talent. But those trends are starting to slow.
As supplies of the “young and restless” tighten, Atlanta’s study exposes disparities between cities that are successfully meeting the demographic challenge and others that are losing out.
Between 1990 and 2000, the period covered by the research, Atlanta increased its number of university-educated 25 to 34 year olds by 46 per cent, while its share of the nationwide group rose faster than any other city’s.
San Francisco and Denver registered the next biggest share gains, while Los Angeles and New York, which have the largest numbers of “young and restless”, suffered the biggest drops.
The Raleigh-Durham area of North Carolina had the highest percentage of the group among its population, reflecting the strength of its universities, followed by the cities of Boston and San Francisco.
In absolute terms, the “young and restless” followed broader shifts in the US population, with the biggest growth in numbers found in southern and western cities, and the biggest losses in north-eastern cities.
“As cities move increasingly into a knowledge-based economy, the kind of talented people each area attracts will determine whether it wins or loses in the campaign for future prosperity,” says a report issued with the study.
Attracting 25 to 34 year olds is “critical” because it is between those ages that people have the greatest flexibility to relocate.
Factors behind Atlanta’s success in wooing the “young and restless” include its relatively low cost of living, plentiful jobs in growing industries, popular universities, large airport, warm climate and diverse culture, says Mr Williams. In addition to deepening the talent pool available to businesses, he says the influx has made Atlanta more attractive to high-tech and creative enterprises and spurred entrepreneurial growth.
As I keep saying, whether we are talking about cities or about countries, there will be winners and losers here.
Tuesday, November 21, 2006
Monday, November 20, 2006
Low Fertility In Europe
by Edward Hugh
This collection of articles by the sexual and reproductive health section of the WHO will contain few surprises for regular readers of DM, but may well prove interesting for those who are less familiar with this topic (careful, PDF file and a very slow loader). Nonetheless there are also some interesting details.
The balance between ensuring female equality and trying to achieve reproduction levels of fertility is not always an easy one. As the editors of this collection say in their introduction:
As can be read from several of the articles in this issue of Entre Nous, upholding the reproductive rights of women and men, also in a European context, can be a challenge and several governments have led pro-natalist policies, which in some cases have been in conflict with ensuring reproductive rights.
The fact that many policy makers in Europe are following the development of the fertility trends closely is signified by the fact that several countries have established high-level national committees to evaluate the possibilities of changing the present demographic trends. For example President Vladimir Putin highlighted the demographic crisis of the Russian Federation in his state-of-the-nation address this year and has made it one of the countries highest priorities: ”First a lower death rate; second, an efficient migration policy; and third, a higher birth rate”.
This edition of Entre Nous is planned to assist policy makers to learn more about the general trends of fertility rates in Europe and the ways some countries are trying to respond to what by some is discussed as the ‘fertility crises’ through support to couples with children and to create family friendly environments. We have invited authors, specialist in this field from academic institutions, professional associations and UN agencies to discuss the role of the health care services in increasing the birth rates. The role of social factors is emphasized in many articles, and the national experts in the field present examples of the policies in countries from different parts of the European region.
The demographer Nikolai Botev, in the first article, offers a very useful summary of the issues of postponement, tempo and quantum effects etc. He also draws attention to how difficult it is to obtain a balance in pro-natalist policies:
Pro-natalist Policies: To Be or Not To Be
This Hamletian question has been on the minds of many policy-makers in Europe. Attitudes towards, and traditions in interventions to influence birth rates vary across Europe. France, a country that up to the Second World War had the lowest fertility in the world, has had a long-standing pro-natalist policy. A broad consensus across the political spectrum exists there around that policy and around the need for strong family support programmes. The policy in France includes, among other things, relatively generous family allowances, parental leave, tax breaks, and other incentives. According to many, the fact that France currently has one of the highest fertility levels in Europe is due to that policy. In general, however, the evidence about the success of such kind of policies is limited and there is an on-going debate about their efficacy and efficiency.
The communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe also had a tradition of active pro-natalism. At different times, they used restrictions on abortions, or fiscal and other incentives to increase the birth rates. This reflected the fact that these regimes were much more likely to perceive policy intervention in private lives acceptable, and people were more likely to tolerate that. As a result, some of these policies created serious problems in the reproductive health field. The case with Ceausescu’s policies in the 1960s is probably the best-known example.
Nowadays, the concern about low fertility in some countries in Eastern Europe is fueled by nationalist and/or ethno-centric sentiments, and voices are often heard that favour measures to increase the birth rates at the expense of reproductive health and rights, and in detriment to women’s status. In the rest of Europe, governments have been guided by the understanding that it is the right of individuals to determine freely the number of children they have.
This is also worthy of note:
All this raises the issue of finding the most effective and efficient ways and means to react to the dramatic demographic changes in Europe. As pointed out earlier, the debate on that issue is still raging. Several broad points could be highlighted though: (1) policies narrowly focused on increasing birth rates are not likely to be successful; instead, demographic change needs to be addressed though comprehensive population policies (i.e. those that address all underlying processes, not just fertility), which in turn need to be an integral part of modern social polices; (2) two of the elements of these policies have to be programmes focusing on social integration of young people, particularly through youth employment, and on better reconciliation of work and family obligations; (3) consistency and continuity have to be among the primary characteristics of these policies – most observers agree that if French polices are to be considered successful, it is because they have been applied consistently over many decades; (4) these policies also need to be contextual, i.e. the mix of policy tools need to reflect the specific conditions and circumstances in a country; (5) they certainly need to be non-coercive, to respect the rights of individuals, and to be acceptable across a broad political spectrum; (6) last but not least, the policies need to be financially viable, i.e. they need to be within the fiscal capacity of a country in the long run – making commitments that are not sustainable financially runs the risk of jeopardizing economic growth and further aggravating the population situation in a country.
So there we have it. We are, as they say, between a rock and a hard place. But all in all the whole collection of articles is worth the read. Doubtless I will be returning to some of them.
This collection of articles by the sexual and reproductive health section of the WHO will contain few surprises for regular readers of DM, but may well prove interesting for those who are less familiar with this topic (careful, PDF file and a very slow loader). Nonetheless there are also some interesting details.
The balance between ensuring female equality and trying to achieve reproduction levels of fertility is not always an easy one. As the editors of this collection say in their introduction:
As can be read from several of the articles in this issue of Entre Nous, upholding the reproductive rights of women and men, also in a European context, can be a challenge and several governments have led pro-natalist policies, which in some cases have been in conflict with ensuring reproductive rights.
The fact that many policy makers in Europe are following the development of the fertility trends closely is signified by the fact that several countries have established high-level national committees to evaluate the possibilities of changing the present demographic trends. For example President Vladimir Putin highlighted the demographic crisis of the Russian Federation in his state-of-the-nation address this year and has made it one of the countries highest priorities: ”First a lower death rate; second, an efficient migration policy; and third, a higher birth rate”.
This edition of Entre Nous is planned to assist policy makers to learn more about the general trends of fertility rates in Europe and the ways some countries are trying to respond to what by some is discussed as the ‘fertility crises’ through support to couples with children and to create family friendly environments. We have invited authors, specialist in this field from academic institutions, professional associations and UN agencies to discuss the role of the health care services in increasing the birth rates. The role of social factors is emphasized in many articles, and the national experts in the field present examples of the policies in countries from different parts of the European region.
The demographer Nikolai Botev, in the first article, offers a very useful summary of the issues of postponement, tempo and quantum effects etc. He also draws attention to how difficult it is to obtain a balance in pro-natalist policies:
Pro-natalist Policies: To Be or Not To Be
This Hamletian question has been on the minds of many policy-makers in Europe. Attitudes towards, and traditions in interventions to influence birth rates vary across Europe. France, a country that up to the Second World War had the lowest fertility in the world, has had a long-standing pro-natalist policy. A broad consensus across the political spectrum exists there around that policy and around the need for strong family support programmes. The policy in France includes, among other things, relatively generous family allowances, parental leave, tax breaks, and other incentives. According to many, the fact that France currently has one of the highest fertility levels in Europe is due to that policy. In general, however, the evidence about the success of such kind of policies is limited and there is an on-going debate about their efficacy and efficiency.
The communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe also had a tradition of active pro-natalism. At different times, they used restrictions on abortions, or fiscal and other incentives to increase the birth rates. This reflected the fact that these regimes were much more likely to perceive policy intervention in private lives acceptable, and people were more likely to tolerate that. As a result, some of these policies created serious problems in the reproductive health field. The case with Ceausescu’s policies in the 1960s is probably the best-known example.
Nowadays, the concern about low fertility in some countries in Eastern Europe is fueled by nationalist and/or ethno-centric sentiments, and voices are often heard that favour measures to increase the birth rates at the expense of reproductive health and rights, and in detriment to women’s status. In the rest of Europe, governments have been guided by the understanding that it is the right of individuals to determine freely the number of children they have.
This is also worthy of note:
All this raises the issue of finding the most effective and efficient ways and means to react to the dramatic demographic changes in Europe. As pointed out earlier, the debate on that issue is still raging. Several broad points could be highlighted though: (1) policies narrowly focused on increasing birth rates are not likely to be successful; instead, demographic change needs to be addressed though comprehensive population policies (i.e. those that address all underlying processes, not just fertility), which in turn need to be an integral part of modern social polices; (2) two of the elements of these policies have to be programmes focusing on social integration of young people, particularly through youth employment, and on better reconciliation of work and family obligations; (3) consistency and continuity have to be among the primary characteristics of these policies – most observers agree that if French polices are to be considered successful, it is because they have been applied consistently over many decades; (4) these policies also need to be contextual, i.e. the mix of policy tools need to reflect the specific conditions and circumstances in a country; (5) they certainly need to be non-coercive, to respect the rights of individuals, and to be acceptable across a broad political spectrum; (6) last but not least, the policies need to be financially viable, i.e. they need to be within the fiscal capacity of a country in the long run – making commitments that are not sustainable financially runs the risk of jeopardizing economic growth and further aggravating the population situation in a country.
So there we have it. We are, as they say, between a rock and a hard place. But all in all the whole collection of articles is worth the read. Doubtless I will be returning to some of them.
Links Department
Here's a useful page I have just found: Global Health Facts. From the main page you can find all sorts of links to up-to-date and useful demographic data: median age, fertility, dependency ratios etc etc etc.
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